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1 Introduction
Accession to Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by the main Europe-
an economies led to an acceleration of the rate at which structural reforms were 
adopted in many member states, including Spain.2 Nevertheless, after ten years of 
EMU membership, the Spanish economy continues to face a number of difficult 
medium and long-term challenges which call for new and ambitious economic 
policy measures. Beyond the immediate problems of the current crisis, two major 
challenges stand out, with direct repercussions for our living standards over the 
coming decades. The first is to complete the process of convergence towards our 
European neighbours’ levels of income and welfare. The second is the rapid ageing 
of Spain’s population – a trend that will make it increasingly difficult to finance 
certain essential public services.
Despite the many things that have changed for the better in the Spanish econo-
my in recent decades, in terms of relative income per capita within the group of the 
most advanced countries, Spain is today in exactly the same position it was in back 
in 1975: i.e. twenty percentage points below the OECD average. The long period 
of expansion which, with its ups and downs, we have enjoyed since 1985, has done 
no more than enable us to recover the ground lost during the profound crisis be-
tween the two years just mentioned. The outlook for the immediate future is not 
good, and things are unlikely to improve until we make a decisive effort to tackle 
some of the structural problems weighing down our growth and competitiveness. 
1 This paper has been translated from Spanish by Ducan Gilson.
2 Alesina, Ardagna and Galasso (2008) present evidence on the adoption of structural reforms in the EMU 
countries. Their findings suggest that in goods and services markets these reforms have been significant, whereas 
adoption of the euro has scarcely had any impact on the adoption of reforms in the labour market.
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The battle for convergence has to be waged on two fronts: productivity and 
employment. In the case of productivity, we have been slipping relative to our 
direct competitors for over twenty years. In the case of employment, our experi-
ence from the last few decades is more positive, but two crucial problems persist. 
Even in the best of times, Spain registers activity and employment rates lower 
than those in comparable countries. And as recent data show, there is a tendency 
for employment to collapse when conditions turn sour. 
The other big challenge we face is demographic. The crisis of the seventies 
also marked the start of a process of ageing which, despite the temporary relief 
brought by the wave of immigration in recent years, looks hard to reverse. Under 
these circumstances, there is no alternative but to redesign our system of social 
protection (including healthcare, pensions and care for dependent persons) to en-
sure its long-term viability.
In both cases, the necessary therapy will be painful in the short term, and 
therefore, unpopular in certain circles. In order to tackle these issues with a rea-
sonable chance of success, we need to start a process of reflection and debate so 
as to raise public awareness and build a consensus that should include the main 
political parties and social actors. This paper is intended as a contribution to this 
debate.3 To this end, we have set out to identify some of the main economic chal-
lenges facing Spanish society today and to make some recommendations about 
the policies that would be necessary in order to overcome these challenges. Some 
of the reforms we propose are important not only in the long term, to ensure 
Spain’s growth and welfare, but also in the short term, to ease the way out of the 
crisis in which we are immersed. From this perspective, some of these reforms are, 
perhaps, even more necessary within EMU than outside of it, given that mem-
bership of the euro has meant renouncing some of the instruments available in 
the past, such as the option of devaluing the currency.
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses the progress of the Span-
ish economy over the last half-century, and its current situation in relation to the 
group of most advanced economies. From this exercise we have extracted a list of 
the three main economic and social challenges our country needs to address over 
the next few decades: increasing the growth rate of productivity, improving the 
functioning of the labour market and ensuring the viability of the social protec-
tion system in the context of a rapidly ageing population. Sections 3 to 5 look 
in more depth at these three topics, each focusing on one aspect of the problem 
we consider to be crucial. Section 3 is devoted to the education system; section 4 
3 The analysis of the Spanish economy’s challenges and the need for structural reforms has been a recur-
rent topic over the last few years, as is highlighted, for example, in the Informe Económico del Presidente del 
Gobierno (Prime Minister’s Economic Report, 2007 and 2008), the Programa Nacional de Reformas 
(National reform programme 2005) and numerous recommendations from the OECD and the European 
Commission.
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to the necessary labour market reforms; and, section 5 the implications of the 
ageing population for the viability of the pension system. Section 6 offers some 
conclusion.
2  The Spanish economy: a comparative perspective 
This section undertakes a comparative analysis of the current situation of the 
Spanish economy and how it has developed over the last few decades in terms 
of some basic economic and demographic indicators. Our reference will be an 
aggregate which we shall call OECD-21, which comprises the main economies 
of the OECD. It excludes the most recent members of the organisation and 
some small economies for which it is sometimes difficult to obtain all the nec-
essary data.4
This section is divided into five sub-sections. In the first of these we use a 
simple decomposition of relative per capita income into three factors linked to 
productivity, employment and demography to perform an initial diagnosis of the 
relative performance of the Spanish economy. In the following three sub-sections 
we look in more detail at each of these factors. The final sub-section summarises 
our main conclusions and presents the topics which will be covered in the rest of 
the paper. 
2.1  The sources of the income differential with comparable 
countries
Chart 2.1.1 shows the variation over time of relative per capita income in 
Spain, the United States and the EU-14 (i.e. the EU-15 minus Luxembourg) 
between 1955 and 2007. This variable is defined as output per capita in each 
territory, corrected for purchasing power differences5 and expressed in loga-
rithmic differences with the OECD-21 average.
The chart suggests that the period we are analysing can be broken down 
into three sub-periods according to the behaviour of Spanish per capita in-
come: a rapid approach to the average (1955-75), a strong reversal of the 
trend (1975-85), and a third phase of more gradual convergence (1985-2007) 
at the end of which Spain was still 20 percentage points below the OECD-21 
average, 7 points from the EU-14 average, and 39 points below the United 
States.
4 Specifically, the members of this aggregate are the countries of the EU-15, with the exception of Lux-
embourg, plus the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Switzerland and Norway.
5 For more details of the construction and sources of the variables used in this section, see Annex 1.
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In order to investigate what lies behind the process we have just described, we 
will start out with a simple breakdown of relative per capita income. The output 
per inhabitant of country i (PCIi) can be expressed in the following form:
 PCI QHGDP
POPi POPi
i GDP
HOURS P1564i i
i
i i LMKTi DEMi* * **== =
HOURSi P1564i  [1]
where POPi is the total population, P1564 the working age population and 
HOURS the total number of hours worked. This breaks per capita output 
down into three components: a demographic component (DEM), which corre-
sponds to the fraction of the population of working age, productivity per hour 
worked (QH), and a third component (LMKT) which incorporates factors 
linked to the behaviour of the labour market. Dividing all the variables by their 
averages in the OECD-21 group and taking logarithms of the resulting expres-
sion, we obtain:
 pci qh  + dem  + lmktii i i=  [2]
where the terms on the right-hand side are the components of relative per capita 
income. Lower-case letters are used to indicate that all the variables are measured 
in logarithmic differences with the sample average (which is approximately equal 
to the percetage difference between these two quantities, provided that this dif-
ference is not too large).
Table 2.1.1 and Chart 2.1.2 summarise the results of the breakdown of Span-
ish relative income per capita into the factors just mentioned. Chart 2.1.2 shows 
the time course of the main components of this variable while Table 2.1.1 gives 
the values in a selection of years between 1960 and 2007.
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The main source of the differential in income between Spain and the OECD 
is currently the low level of productivity per hour worked, followed by a below-
average utilisation rate of human resources. The first of these factors contrib-
utes more than 13 percentage points to the income differential with respect to 
the OECD average, while the contribution of the second factor is 8 percentage 
points. The only mildly positive factor is demography, which reduces the gap in 
per capita income by six tenths of a point.
Looking back, things have changed significantly over the last half century. The 
demographic component of per capita income was negative until just a few years 
ago, and has followed a U-shaped curve, with a minimum value of –8.1 points 
in 1980. Also, the productivity differential fell by 29 points between 1960 and 
2007, while the labour market component registered a slight deterioration be-
tween the start and the end of the period. 
The last two components of relative income experienced significant fluctua-
tions over the course of the last half century, moving in opposite directions for 
much of it. Between 1960 and 1985, Spain’s relative productivity improved spec-
1960 1975 1985 1995 2007
Per capita income -51.4% -20.1% -35.0% -28.2% -20.4%
Demography (share of the population of working age) -2.1% -6.8% -6.5% -1.9% 0.6%
Labour market (hours per person aged 15-64) -7.3% 2.2% -33.0% -27.2% -7.9%
Productivity (output per hour worked) -42.1% -15.5% 4.5% 0.9% -13.1%
Memo:
Income per person of working age -49.4% -13.3% -28.5% -26.3% -21.1%
RELATIVE PER CAPITA INCOME IN SPAIN AND ITS COMPONENTS TABLE 2.1.1 
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tacularly (almost 47 points in 25 years), reaching a peak 4.5 points above the 
OECD-21 average in 1985. Since then, however, the trend has been reversed. 
Between 1985 and 2007 Spain lost almost 18 points in relative productivity per 
hour worked, thus returning to its 1977 position.
The behaviour of the labour market component of income per capita is very 
different. Between 1960 and 1975 there was a slight improvement (9.5 points), 
which put Spain slightly above the average. Between 1975 and 1985, however, 
the deterioration in the labour market subtracted 35 points from relative income. 
Two thirds of the ground lost during this dramatic fall was gradually recovered 
over the last two decades.
2.1.1 The challenge of real convergence
The data reviewed above point to two clear grounds for concern about the 
current state of the Spanish economy and its relative performance over the last 
half century. The first is the evolution of productivity. In 2007 output per hour 
worked in Spain was 13% below the OECD average and had fallen by almost 
18 points over the two previous decades. The second is the poor functioning of 
Spain’s labour market. Despite the fact that in 2007 the Spanish economy was in 
the most favourable position it had been in for almost three decades in terms of 
employment, the labour market component of our relative income continued to 
be almost eight points below the average for the reference sample. Adding both 
factors together, the gap in per capita income between Spain and the OECD av-
erage slightly exceeded 20 percentage points in 2007, almost exactly the same 
value as registered in 1975, more than 30 years ago. The short-term prospects 
are, moreover, clearly negative and point towards the likelihood of Spain’s process 
of convergence with the group of comparable countries going into reverse.
The first long-term challenge the Spanish economy is facing is therefore that 
of breaking through this “glass ceiling” situated twenty points below the OECD 
average. This is a level which has so far represented an impassable barrier to our 
relative position within the group of the world’s wealthiest economies. In what 
follows we will try to look in more detail at some of the aspects of the diagnosis 
sketched out in this section and identify the type of measures that will be neces-
sary to complete Spain’s transformation into an economy fully able to compete 
with the most advanced countries on an equal footing. 
2.2 The labour market
The labour market component of relative per capita income can in turn be 
broken down into three factors linked to labour-force participation and employ-
ment rates (LFPR and ER), and the number of hours worked per employed per-
son (HW), respectively:
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 LMKT LFPRLF
P1564i P1564i
i
LFi
i i ER i HWi* * **== =
NEPiHOURSi HOURSi
NEPi
 [3]
where LFi and NEPi refer to the labour force (active population) and the number 
of employed persons, respectively. Taking logarithmic difference from the aggre-
gate average, we obtain:
 + +lmkt i lfpr i er i hw i=  [4]
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1960 1975 1985 1995 2007
Labour force participation rate -6.5% -5.5% -16.0% -11.2% -3.2%
Employment rate 0.2% 0.5% -15.1% -15.7% -3.1%
Hours per worker -0.9% 7.1% -1.9% -0.3% -1.6%
TOTAL LABOUR MARKET -7.3% 2.2% -33.0% -27.2% -7.9%
LABOUR MARKET COMPONENTS OF RELATIVE SPANISH 
PER CAPITA INCOME
 TABLE 2.2.1 
Chart 2.2.1 shows the variation in the labour market components of relative per 
capita income. With the notable exception of the period 1991-94, participation 
and employment rates have always run in parallel. Both indicators display a sharp 
decline between 1975 and 1985 and a gradual, although somewhat irregular, recov-
ery after 1985. At the end of the period in the sample, each of these factors contrib-
uted around three points to the income gap with the OECD-21. Finally, the “hours 
worked” series shows a relatively flat profile after 1983, with a value close to the av-
erage. In the first half of the period, however, significant fluctuations occurred, with 
a peak in the mid-seventies followed by a sharp fall in the subsequent decade. 
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A more detailed examination of the comparative progress of some of these in-
dicators will allow us to identify some of the specific features of Spain’s experi-
ence. Even in the best of times, Spain registers labour-force participation and em-
ployment rates lower than the OECD averages. In times of crisis, moreover, both 
variables tend to drop more rapidly than in other economies. Both phenomena 
are illustrated in Charts 2.2.2 and 2.2.3, where Spain’s labour force participation 
and unemployment rates during the period 1960-2007 are compared with the 
average, maximum and minimum values in our sample. What stands out is that 
over an uninterrupted period since the mid-seventies, Spain has enjoyed the du-
bious honour of having both the highest unemployment rate in the OECD-21 
and a below-average labour-force participation rate.
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The first of the two problems we have just highlighted (low employment rates 
even in boom times) seems to be concentrated almost exclusively in the female 
population, which suggests that systematic barriers remain to the full incorpora-
tion of women to the labour market and that these barriers are higher in Spain 
than in other industrial countries. Using data from 2007, Charts 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 
show the labour-force participation and unemployment rates broken down by sex 
and age group in Spain, along with the average for the EU-15. In the case of 
men, there is practically no difference between Spain and the EU (for this reason 
the European data are omitted). The labour-force participation and employment 
rates for Spanish women, however, are lower than the European figures for al-
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most all age groups, and in turn, these are almost always lower than the figures 
for their male counterparts. 
The difference in labour-force participation and employment rates in favour of 
men tends to widen with age, at least between the ages of 25 and 55 years. This 
phenomenon may partly reflect differences between cohorts in attitudes and social 
norms regarding women’s participation in the labour market. To control for this fac-
tor, Charts 2.2.6 and 2.2.7 summarise the same data as shown in the previous two 
charts, but in this case focusing only on Spain and the progress of one cohort over 
time. We also observe an increase in the differential in favour of men during fer-
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tile years, which tends to be inverted after the age of 35 or 40, however. This pat-
tern suggests that the lower labour-force participation and employment rates among 
women that we observe in the data are fairly closely related to the difficulties exist-
ing in Spain for making family responsibilities compatible with work, and that the 
burden of these responsibilities falls disproportionately on women. Certain factors 
which may considerably aggravate the problem are the limited flexibility of labour 
contracts, the incompatibility between work and school hours and holidays, and the 
shortage of affordable child-care and care for the elderly.
The second peculiarity of Spain’s labour market is its tendency to adjust in terms 
of quantity rather than prices, which means jobs are destroyed rapidly during a cri-
sis. In the decade following the first oil crisis in the seventies, the number of jobs per 
working age person fell by 23% in Spain, compared with a drop of 3% across the 
OECD-21, a fall of 8% in the EU-15 and a rise of 2% in the United States. During 
the recession in the early nineties the story was similar, although less dramatic. In the 
three years following the start of the crisis, the employment indicator fell by 6.4% in 
Spain, 3.5% in the EU-15, 2.3% in the United States, and 1.9% in the OECD. 
The data from the last quarters of 2008 also point in the same direction. 
Chart 2.2.8 shows the increase in the employment rate recorded between the 
third quarter of 2007 and the third quarter of 2008. Spain is, by a wide margin, 
the EU country in which this indicator has been most adverse, with the unem-
ployment rate rising by more than 2.5 points (from 8.7% to 11.4%), compared 
with an average of just a tenth of a point for the EU-15 as a whole (from 6.9% 
to 7%). According to the Spanish Labour Force Survey (Encuesta de Población 
SOURCE: Eurostat (2008a), Labour Force Survey. Population 15-64. 
KEY: ES=Spain: UK=United Kingdom; BE=Belgium; DK=Denmark; SE=Sweeden; PT=Portugal; AT=Austria; 
FR=France; NL=Netherlands; IT=Italy; FI=Finland; GR=Greece; DE=Germany.
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Activa, EPA), the number people out of work rose during the fourth quarter of 
2008 by more than 600,000, adding 2.6 points to the unemployment rate in 
the third quarter. This has undoubtedly widened our differential with the Eu-
ropean average even further.
2.3 The evolution of productivity
The productivity component of relative per capita income (qh) can be broken 
down into various factors using an aggregate production function. We shall assume 
that this is of the Cobb-Douglas type, with constant returns to scale in labour and 
capital for a given average level of training of the labour force. Under these as-
sumptions, the production function can be expressed in intensive form, as a func-
tion relating output per hour worked to the stock of capital per hour worked (k), 
average educational attainment (edu) and total factor productivity (tfp):
 +qh i tfp i k edui ieduk=  +   [5]
As before, all the variables are measured in relative terms, that is to say, in loga-
rithmic deviations from the weighted sample average. The coefficients k and edu 
are the elasticities of output with respect to the various factors of production and 
measure the percentage increase in output that would be produced by an increase of 
1% in the stock of each factor considered, while keeping the other factors constant.
The data on capital we have used in order to apply equation [5] correspond 
to the stock of non-residential private capital, while the level of educational at-
tainment is measured in terms of the adult population’s average number of years 
of schooling.6 The values assigned to the elasticities shown in equation [5] (k = 
0.345 and edu= 0.394) come from de la Fuente and Doménech (2002), who es-
timated an aggregate production function using OECD-21 data that are similar 
(but not identical) to those used here. 
Using equation [5] we can break down Spain’s relative productivity into the con-
tributions of physical and human capital and total factor productivity. Table 2.3.1 
and Chart 2.3.1 summarise the results.
One very surprising aspect of these results is that the estimated level of Span-
ish TFP is higher than the average for the OECD-21 throughout the period ana-
lysed. This indicator reached a peak of 25% above the average (15% above the 
United States) in the mid-eighties. This result is rather implausible, suggesting 
the possible existence of measurement problems that could be biasing the esti-
mate of Spanish TFP upwards (it should be remembered that TFP is obtained as 
a residual, by subtracting the contributions of the various factors of production 
6 See Annex 1.
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from relative productivity). One possible reason for this would be a systematic 
undervaluation of the average hours worked, as this would lead to an overvalu-
ation of the relative productivity and the contribution of the capital stock (per 
hour). Another factor suggesting that these results should be interpreted with ex-
treme caution is that the levels of TFP are sensitive to the sectoral structure of 
prices in the base year used to construct the real output series (Dabán, Doménech 
and Molinas, 1997).
It would therefore seem advisable to focus more on the way TFP varies over 
time than on its absolute values. From this viewpoint, the most noteworthy fea-
ture of Chart 2.3.1 is the rapid loss of relative efficiency suffered by the Span-
ish economy over the last two decades. Indeed, between 1990 and 2007 Spanish 
TFP declined in absolute as well as relative terms.
As for the remainder of the components of relative productivity, the contribu-
tion of human capital has been on an upward trend since 1970. At the end of the 
period, however, the level of qualifications of Spain’s population still contributed 
slightly more than 10 percentage points to the differential between Spain’s in-
come and productivity and the average for the reference group of countries, thus 
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1960 1975 1985 1995 2007
Total factor productivity 7.3% 21.4% 25.1% 17.5% 1.8%
Physical capital -26.9% -13.2% 0.2% -0.1% -4.8%
Education -22.5% -23.7% -20.7% -16.6% -10.1%
TOTAL PRODUCTIVITY (output per hour worked) -42.1% -15.5% 4.5% 0.9% -13.1%
PRODUCTIVITY COMPONENTS OF RELATIVE SPANISH PER CAPITA INCOME TABLE 2.3.1 
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making it the main direct source of the productivity gap. A clear pattern of con-
vergence to the mean is also observable in terms of the stock of physical capital. 
Convergence in this factor is stronger than that observed in the case of human 
capital and is concentrated in the first half of the sample period. It should be 
noted that the approach to the other countries’ average physical capital stock per 
unit of labour which took place during the period of crisis was largely due to the 
rapid loss of jobs. Moreover, the doubts and reservations already expressed about 
the “hours worked” data series lead to uncertainty over the validity of the level of 
this series which, according to our estimates, would point to a productivity gap 
between Spain and the OECD-21 of just 5 points in 2007.
2.4 Demography
The second big challenge the Spanish economy faces is the rapid ageing of 
the country’s population, and all this entails in terms of growing difficulties for 
funding some of the main social benefits. The problem is not readily apparent in 
the retrospective breakdown of income we have taken as a starting point, but it 
becomes obvious as soon as we start looking at how basic demographic indicators 
have evolved. 
As we have already seen, the demographic component of Spain’s relative 
per capita income has developed favourably over the last three decades. This 
phenomenon, however, corresponds to the initial period of a process of ageing 
which began late in Spain, but has been very rapid. In its early stages, this proc-
ess translated into an increase in the relative weight of the population of work-
ing age, in detriment of younger cohorts. As time goes by, however, the trend is 
for these two groups to shrink relative to the older population, causing the sign 
of demographic component to change. This could lead to serious problems for 
the sustainability of public finances. We will look at some of these issues in 
more detail below.
Charts 2.4.1 and 2.4.2 show how Spain’s relative situation has evolved in terms of 
the relative sizes of the various different population segments. Up until the nineties, 
Spain’s population was relatively young, with the share of the population of school 
age being above the OECD average and the share of the population aged over 65 
below the OECD average. After the nineties, however, the situation reversed: the 
share of the population of retirement age moved above the average and the share of 
the youngest population segment became one of the lowest in the sample. 
The immediate causes of this phenomenon are shown in Charts 2.4.3 and 
2.4.4. These causes are the considerable increase in life expectancy registered dur-
ing the period, and in particular, the sharp drop in the Spanish birth rate. This 
fell by more than 50% between the mid-seventies and mid-eighties leaving Spain 
with one of the lowest fertility rates in the world.
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Charts 2.4.1, 2.4.2 and 2.4.4 show a slight trend towards an inversion of the 
ageing process of the Spanish population during the first few years of the present 
century. During this period the crude birth rate picked up slightly, while the 
school-age population as a share of the total stabilised and the population aged 
over 65 fell slightly. These three phenomena are the result of the rapid inflow of 
immigrants during the period, as newcomers were characterised by a lower aver-
age age and a higher fertility rate than the native population. The quantitative 
importance of this phenomenon can be seen clearly in Chart 2.4.5. The number 
of people of foreign origin in Spain rose from 0.6 million in 1998 (1.6% of the 
SOURCE: AMECO database. Average is the unweighted average of the OECD-21 countries. 
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total) to 5.3 million in 2008 (11.4%). Three quarters of the increase in Spain’s 
population during the last decade was as a result of immigration.
As we shall see below, the most reliable forecasts suggest that immigration can 
provide only temporary relief from the ageing process. The high levels of immigra-
tion seen in recent years would be difficult to sustain over the long term, and the 
forecasted flows are insufficient to offset the decline in the population of fertile age, 
which has already started, or the continuing increase in longevity expected over the 
coming decades. The demographic outlook, therefore, is for a continuation, and 
indeed an acceleration, of the process of ageing that has already begun.
SOURCE: INE (2008c). 
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Chart 2.4.6 presents some of the immediate causes of this phenomenon in 
visual form. The graph shows the distribution of the population resident in 
Spain according to its date of birth. The population curve clearly reveals the 
effects of the Civil War, the long baby-boom from 1955 to 1975 and the con-
sequences of the fall in birth rates over the last three decades. The vertical lines 
on the graph divide the population according to three age segments. Shifting 
the window marking out the working age population towards the right gives 
us an idea of where we are heading. A large part of these baby-boom cohorts 
have now left their fertile years behind them and are approaching retirement, 
SOURCE: Municipal census, INE (2008b). 
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while the cohorts joining the working age segment will soon be smaller than 
those leaving it.
2.5 Summary and plan of the following sections
Over the coming decades, Spanish society will face two big economic challeng-
es: The first is to complete the process of real convergence with the countries of the 
OECD and, the second to adopt the reforms necessary to ensure the viability of 
the welfare state in an adverse demographic context. Both challenges have multi-
ple dimensions and call for actions of various types. To get closer to income levels 
in the more advanced countries we need to speed up our productivity growth 
and improve the functioning of our labour market, both in boom times and in 
crises. The first goal requires that we invest more, and more efficiently, in various 
types of tangible and intangible assets, but also that we adopt complementary 
measures to eliminate unnecessary obstacles to economic activity and to increase 
competitiveness and improve the regulation of our goods and services markets. 
The second requires a diverse range of legal and institutional changes, together 
with specific actions to eliminate the obstacles that still remain to the full incor-
poration of women to the job market. Finally, the demographic challenge will de-
mand changes in many aspects of the social protection system, including health-
care, pensions and assistance to dependent persons.
It would be impossible to address all these issues in a single paper. Given the 
limitations of space and time we face, we have decided to concentrate on three is-
sues we feel are crucial to the country’s economic future: the education system, and 
the necessary labour market and pension system reforms. Each of the following 
sections focuses on one of these topics. Along with our comparative advantage in 
understanding some of them, this choice is also justified by the fact that other chal-
lenges facing the Spanish economy are highly dependent upon the challenges we 
examine here. For example, although increasing R&D investment is necessary in 
Spain in order to get closer to the leading OECD countries, such investment may 
be hampared by the lack of a sufficiently educated population or by the existence of 
distortions in markets for labour and goods that may reduce the incentives to invest 
in R&D. Something similar is also true of Spain’s international competitiveness, in 
that improving it would require flexible and competitive markets for labour as well 
as goods and services, and a bigger investment effort in human capital and R&D.
3 The educational challenge
One of the clearest implications of the preceding section is that improving pro-
ductivity has to be among the basic priorities of Spain’s economic policy. Of the 
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many factors that could have an impact on this variable, in this paper we will focus 
on education. This is partly for reasons of space and comparative advantage, and 
partly because we are convinced that, as a growing body of empirical evidence sug-
gests, education is a key long-term determinant of both productivity and employ-
ment in a world in which output is increasingly knowledge intensive.7 
3.1 The current state of education in Spain
Over the last few decades Spanish society has made a big effort to raise its level 
of education. Whereas in 1960 10% of the adult population was illiterate and the 
majority barely had primary education, in 2001 the rate of illiteracy had fallen to 
below 3% and was concentrated in the elderly, while almost 60% of the popula-
tion had completed secondary or university education. As a result of this proc-
ess of accumulation of human capital, the average number of years of schooling 
among the adult population rose by approximately 70% between 1960 and 2000 
(4.97 to 8.19 years), with the bulk of the improvement concentrated in the last 
two decades. 
As can be seen in Chart 3.1.1, this effort has served to considerably narrow the 
educational divide between Spain and the group of comparison countries, but has 
7 The literature on the topic is very extensive and this is not the place for anything more than a very brief 
summary. For an overview, see de la Fuente and Ciccone (2003), de la Fuente (2004) and Doménech (2008).
NOTE: The percentage difference in average years of training in each reference territory and Spain. 
EU-13 is the unweighted average of the EU-15 excluding Luxembourg and Spain. 
Data from de la Fuente and Doménech (2006a). For some countries, the series have been extended from 1990 
or 1995 up until 2005 using the growth rates for number of years training implicit in Cohen and Soto's series (2001) 
for the period concerned.  
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not eliminated it. Between 1960 and 2005 the distance from the EU-15 average 
(excluding Luxembourg and Spain) and from the United States in terms of aver-
age schooling shrank considerably, dropping from 36 to 19 and from 53 to 31 
percentage points, respectively.
Although the improvement in relative average educational attainment in Spain 
has undoubtedly been considerable, at least three important problems remain. 
The first is that our average level of training is still a long way from the average in 
comparable countries. The second is that the educational structure of the popu-
lation is still very imbalanced, with a bias towards the extremes. We have a rela-
tively high proportion of university graduates, but also a large proportion of the 
population that has not managed to get beyond compulsory schooling. The third 
problem is the inadequate quality of our educational system, which is manifest, 
among other things, in the poor performance of Spain’s pupils in internation-
al standardised tests or the weak position of our universities in the international 
quality rankings.8 
The first of these problems appears to be on its way to being solved, at least 
partly, but not the second or the third. Chart 3.1.2 shows the breakdown of the 
8 To these three problems we could add a fourth, which we will not address in this paper. This is the ex-
istence of marked differences in education between regions, which do not appear to be diminishing of their 
own accord. On this topic, see de la Fuente and Doménech (2006b) and de la Fuente (2006a). Fuentes 
(2009) analyses in detail the situation of the education system in Spain in relation to other OECD countries 
and the reforms needed to improve its results. 
NOTES: Percentage of the population in each age group that has completed each stage of education, standardised 
by unweighted sample average. The OECD-20 is the OECD-21 minus Japan, for which no data are available for 
secondary education.  
SOURCE: OECD (2008a).  
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Spanish population by educational attainment (low, medium and high) across 
different age groups. The share of the population at each level of educational 
attainment has been normalised using the OECD-21 average (excluding Japan, 
for which not all the necessary data are available) in order to highlight Spain’s 
relative position. The breakdown by age groups makes it possible to analyse 
how our relative situation has varied over time as we take the younger cohorts 
into account. 
If we focus on the fraction of the population that has finished some form of 
tertiary education (that is to say, has obtained a university qualification or ad-
vanced professional training), the situation is not bad and has improved rapidly 
over time. Considering the working age population as a whole, Spain is currently 
only slightly below the OECD average and is above this reference if we consider 
only the youngest adult cohort (between 25 and 34 years of age). 
In the case of the other two groups, the situation is much less satisfactory. 
The relative size of the least qualified population segment (i.e. persons complet-
ing no more than the first stage of secondary education) has remained almost 
constant in all the cohorts at a level higher than that observed in other ad-
vanced countries. The intermediate group (i.e. those who have completed up-
per secondary education or basic vocational training) is well below the average 
in terms of its relative size and, although progress can be seen when comparing 
the three older cohorts with one another, the situation appears to have stag-
nated in the last decade. As shown in Chart 3.1.3 the situation is similar when 
we compare ourselves with our EU neighbours in terms of school failure rates. 
NOTE: Percentage of the population aged 18 to 24 that has not completed the first stage of  secondary education 
and is not in school.  
 
SOURCE: Eurostat (2008b). 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
 EU-15  SPAIN 
PREMATURE SCHOOL-LEAVING RATE CHART 3.1.3 
212 Spain and the euro. The fi rst ten years 
A worrying fraction of young Spaniards receive only the education that is legal-
ly compulsory. By contrast with what we see in the EU, moreover, this fraction 
does not show any clear downward trend over time, and has even tended to rise 
slightly in recent years.
To the quantitative deficits we have just highlighted we also need to add a 
significant and growing qualitative deficit which shows up, among other places, 
in the poor performance of our secondary school pupils on standardised interna-
tional aptitude tests such as those carried out by the OECD through the PISA 
project. As can be seen in Chart 3.1.4, Spain has been well below the OECD 
average in the last two rounds of PISA, both in mathematics and reading com-
prehension. Moreover, it shows an extremely worrying backward trend on both 
scales, particularly the second, in both absolute and relative terms. 
Although these indicators need to be interpreted with caution, another wor-
rying sign of the unsatisfactory quality of our education (and research) system is 
the weak position of Spanish universities on international rankings.9 According 
to the most frequently cited rankings, namely those to the University of Shanghai 
and the Times World University Ranking, Spain’s top institution is below posi-
9 See http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Clasificación_académica_de_universidades and http://www.topuni-
versities.com/worlduniversityrankings/.
NOTES: Observation 1 (obs 1) combines the results of the test of reading in 2000 with that of mathematics 
in 2003, while observation 2 combines the average results of both tests in 2006. All results are standardised 
using the sample average in each year (which reduces the two tests by 1.1% in the case of reading and 0.5% 
in the case of mathematics). The sample comprises all the OECD countries that took part in the relevant tests 
with the exception of Mexico.  
SOURCE: OECD (2007a).
Key: ES = Spain, Tu = Turkey, Gr = Greece, It = Italy, Po = Portugal, Sk = Slovakia, NZ = New Zealand, 
Can = Canada, Aus = Australia, Fin = Finland and Ko = Korea.  
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tion 150. According to this latter source, of the world’s top 100 universities, 37 
were in the US, 17 in Britain, 7 in Australia, 5 in Canada and 5 in China (in-
cluding Hong Kong). Japan and the Netherlands each had 4 institutions in the 
group, Germany and Switzerland 3, France, South Korea, Singapore, Denmark 
and Sweden 2 and, Belgium, Finland, Israel, Ireland, and New Zealand each 
had 1. Finally, universities in Austria, Taiwan, India, Thailand, Mexico, Norway, 
South Africa and Russia are listed in the rankings above the first Spanish institu-
tion (the University of Barcelona).
3.2 What education policies? Some lessons from the literature
The economics literature suggests that the stock of human capital is an im-
portant determinant of income levels and a strategic competitiveness factor in an 
increasingly knowledge-based economy. Therefore, correcting the problems out-
lined above is a necessary condition for Spain’s desired convergence with the most 
advanced countries in terms of income and welfare.10
As we have seen, there is considerable room for improvement in our stock of ed-
ucational capital in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In relation to the first 
of these dimensions, there is a long way to go before our upper secondary enroll-
ment ratios approach those seen in most industrialised countries. At some point, 
however, additional increases in the average number of years of schooling will in-
evitably lead to rapidly diminishing returns.11 In the long term, therefore, it seems 
clear that educational quality rather than quantity is the more relevant margin.
Designing policies which help improve student performance is, however, a com-
plicated issue for which the aggregate comparative studies prevailing in the litera-
ture on education and growth provide little guidance in practice. There is, however, 
a considerable volume of micro-econometric research on the economics of educa-
tion which gives us at least some general indications that may be helpful in setting 
policy priorities. The main implications can be summarised in two propositions. 
Firstly, offering the right incentives to all the participants in the educational proc-
ess is likely to be more important than increasing the volume of resources, at least 
in advanced countries where expenditure on schooling is already very significant. 
And, secondly, higher returns from investments in education are associated with 
10  This section is based on de la Fuente (2006b). See also Círculo de Empresarios (2006) for another 
analysis along similar lines.
11 Econometric estimates of aggregate production functions do not suggest rapidly diminishing rates of 
return to increases in the average level of schooling around the observed levels of this variable. Even so, the re-
turn to education will drop if young people stay in the education system longer because their working lives will 
be shorter, thus reducing the period over which they enjoy the returns on the investment in their education. 
Moreover, the appearance of sharply diminishing returns is inevitable at some point. It does not seem likely, for 
example, that the whole population has the necessary ability to be able to benefit from higher education.
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early interventions, particularly when these are focused on children from disadvan-
taged families.
3.2.1 Determinants of the quality of education
Economists tend to think about education as a standard production proc-
ess in which various types of input (pupils’, parents’ and teachers’ time, school 
facilities, textbooks and other teaching materials, etc.) are combined to pro-
duce an educational output that we could identify with the acquisition of use-
ful knowledge and skills. When we look at things in this way, it is tempting 
to think that any desired increase in students’ academic performance can be 
obtained by injecting sufficient resources into the education system. In fact, 
many discussions on education policy implicitly take this approach and focus 
on the need to increase expenditure in order to reduce the number of students 
per classroom, buy more computers, cut tuition fees or increase the number of 
scholarships.
Unfortunately, the problem is rather more complicated. A considerable number 
of papers in the recent literature suggest that increasing inputs does not necessarily 
yield better academic performance. Despite the sharp rise in spending per pupil 
and the continuous drop in the number of students per classroom, school per-
formance does not appear to have been on an upward trend over the last few 
decades in most OECD countries and in fact has declined significantly in many 
of them (Hanushek, 2003, Hanushek and Woessmann, 2008 and Gundlach et 
al, 2001). Nor is there a clear cross-country correlation between spending lev-
els and results on international standardized tests.12 Finally, micro-econometric 
estimates of educational production functions with very different samples of 
students yield rather inconclusive results in the best of cases, and a preponder-
ance of non-significant coefficients or coefficients with the “wrong” sign (see 
Hanushek 2003 for a meta-analysis of these papers and Wöessmann 2003 and 
2005 for two thorough studies on the topic in which two broad internation-
al samples of individual data are used). Although the debate is far from over, 
as the probable endogeneity of the allocation of resources within and between 
schools makes it difficult to isolate the causal impact of classroom sizes and 
other input indicators on educational performance13, Heckman (2000) main-
tains that, even if we accept the most optimistic estimates found in the litera-
ture on the effects of teacher/pupil ratios on the future income of the pupils, 
12 Hanushek (2003) and Hanushek and Kimko (H&K 2000) conclude that the usual indicators on the 
use of resources in the education system do not have a perceptible effect on the quality of education, meas-
ured by standard performance tests. Lee and Barro (2001), however, find a positive correlation between some 
of the expenditure variables and the results on these tests.
13 The arguments and findings in the literature are contradictory. See, inter alia, Hanushek (1986 and 
2003), Card and Krueger (1996) and Krueger (2002).
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reducing the number of students per teacher would be an inefficient policy 
with negative expected returns.
Overall, therefore, it looks unlikely that indiscriminate increases in spend-
ing would contribute significantly to improving academic performance among 
pupils in Spain or in other European countries.14 Some of the leading experts 
in this field maintain that a more promising alternative would be to focus on 
providing appropriate incentives for students, teachers and school managers, 
broadening the possibilities of choice for parents and increasing competition 
between educational establishments. One measure that seems to have a sub-
stantial positive effect on the incentives of agents in the education system is the 
introduction of standardised curriculum-based tests as a requirement for ob-
taining educational credentials, together with the publication of average results 
and indicators of value added for each school. Bishop (1997) has found that 
centralised examinations have a significant positive effect on pupils’ academic 
performance both across countries and across Canadian provinces. Hanushek 
and Raymond (2003) also find positive results in relation to the introduction 
of accountability systems by schools in various states in the US. Wöessmann 
(2003) has confirmed these findings using a larger sample including data from 
39 countries. This last author also concludes that greater school autonomy in 
certain areas (but not in others) has a positive effect on academic performance 
– particularly in countries where there are centralized examinations. According 
to these findings, greater autonomy regarding staff and internal organisation, 
together with greater freedom for teachers to choose their own teaching meth-
ods, contribute to improving school performance because they allow schools 
to use their direct knowledge of the circumstances and needs of their pupils. 
However, Wöessmann also concludes that control over budgetary issues and the 
curriculum should be kept relatively centralised in order to avoid possible op-
portunistic behaviours whereby individuals seek to reduce workloads or obtain 
financial gain.
Other measures that also seem to have positive effects, presumably through 
improved incentives, include introducing incentive schemes in teachers’ pay, 
the existence of competition from privately managed (although not necessar-
ily privately financed) schools, and increased parental choice through school 
vouchers and other similar systems (see Hanushek 2003, Heckman, 2000, 
Wöessmann and Schütz, 2006, and the references given in these papers). On 
the other hand, some authors warn that it is not easy to design incentive sys-
14 A form of exception to this pattern in results is related to the quality of teachers. Hanushek (2003) 
and Wöessman and Schütz (2006) review a number of empirical findings that suggest that this factor has an 
important effect on pupils’ academic performance. These same authors also observe that it is extraordinarily 
difficult to link teachers’ performance to ex ante observable characteristics, such as their level of education or 
experience.
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tems correctly, and that the use of badly designed schemes can have adverse 
effects on performance (see Hanushek 2003 and Ladd and Walsh, 2002, for 
example).
3.2.2 Learning over the course of the life cycle
Acquiring knowledge and cognitive and non-cognitive skills is a continual 
process in which the competencies acquired at each stage are a crucial input to 
the next, enabling the individual to continue progressing. In a series of papers 
Heckman and various co-authors (see, among others, Cunha et al., 2005, and 
Heckman, 2000), develop a life-cycle model of competency acquisition which 
incorporates the available evidence from the literature in economics and other 
disciplines on the characteristics of the learning process and on the returns to 
investments in human capital during various stages of life for people in dif-
ferent socio-economic strata. These authors highlight that the learning proc-
ess starts very early in life and is decisively influenced by family environment, 
that there are critical periods for the acquisition of certain basic skills and that 
some of them crystallise very early and are very difficult to improve later.
Heckman’s model, together with his review of the existing empirical evidence, 
provides some useful suggestions on the efficient assignment of resources to dif-
ferent age and income groups. One important prediction of the model that ap-
pears to be borne out by empirical studies is that the return on investment in 
human capital declines with age in a way that varies systematically across socio-
economic strata. Returns fall with age in all cases because learning at an early age 
enables additional knowledge to be acquired and because the time during which 
the investment generates additional income flows grows shorter as the individual 
ages. Returns to investment at early stages tend to be highest for children from 
disadvantaged families, because intensive intervention can compensate, at least 
partly, for the effects of an adverse family environment at a critical age for the ac-
quisition of very basic skills.15 In the absence of these interventions, however, the 
return to additional investments in disadvantaged individuals drops off rapidly 
with age as skill deficits accumulate, and tend to fall below the return on invest-
ment in individuals from higher income families at a relatively early age. There 
is consequently a clear trade-off between equity and efficiency at more advanced 
ages, but not for very young children.
Heckman and his co-authors build a convincing case in favour of a strategy 
of active intervention at early ages focusing on the more disadvantaged popu-
lation groups as a way of promoting both efficiency and effective equality of 
15 There is substantial evidence that early and intensive interventions have  substantial and long-lasting ef-
fects. In addition to Cunha and the references cited therein, see, for example Barnett (1990 and 1995) and 
Goodman and Sianesi (2005).
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opportunity.16 The evidence presented by these authors also suggests that at-
tempts to remedy educational deficits at later ages are of limited effectiveness 
and very costly, and that these deficits, rather than the possible existence of 
financial constraints, are the main obstacle to many young people from low in-
come families obtaining advanced education.
This all suggests that an important goal of education policy must be to seek to 
integrate children from disadvantaged families early on an academically oriented 
preschool system in order to prevent from early skills deficits that may have long-
lasting adverse consequences. By contrast, some of the measures frequently advo-
cated as a means for facilitating lower income groups’ access to post-compulsory 
education, such a highly subsidised university fees, may have only a limited effect.
3.3 Some further reflections
A peculiar feature of Spanish society is the lack of a basic educational consen-
sus. Different sectors of society and the political parties that represent them hold 
opposing views on important aspects of the educational model. To a large extent, 
the conflict has focused on the schools’ role in the transmission of values, as has 
been highlighted by the bitter disputes between left and right over subjects such 
as religious education and citizenship education, but it also extends to other areas 
and reveals important differences in views regarding the basic mission of the edu-
cational system and the philosophy that should inspire its design. 
The result of this disagreement has been a high degree of legislative instabili-
ty. Ever since the transition to democracy, each time the ruling party has changed, 
there has been a reform of the basic legislation on education. A major education 
reform approved by the socialist government in 1990 (the Organic Law on the Ed-
ucational System or LOGSE) was followed by a counter-reform passed during the 
People’s Party second legislature (with the LOCE or Organic Law for the Quality 
of Education). A new socialist government suspended the application of this law 
immediately after winning the 2004 election, and replaced it two years later with a 
new law (the LOE or Organic Law for Education) which to a large extent marked 
the return to the LOGSE model.
Almost everyone agrees that such swings are not good for the educational sys-
tem. Building on such a fragile foundation, it may be advisable to try to forge a 
16 Schuetz et al (2005) reach the same conclusion in an interesting study in which they built an index 
of (in)equality of opportunities for over 50 countries based on the estimated influence of family socio-eco-
nomic status on students’ academic performance. The authors explore the determinants of this index and 
conclude that countries with high rates of participation in long stages of pre-school education tend to pro-
duce greater equality of opportunity. They also conclude that systems in which there is an early separation of 
students into different types of centre according to their performance have a negative impact on equality of 
opportunity.
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minimum consensus that may give the system the stability it needs to function 
properly. To make progress in this direction, it may be necessary to leave out the 
more ideologically charged aspects of the problem (such as the status of religious 
education) in order to concentrate on the academic core of the problem. To be 
able to advance in this direction, we need to find ways to advance simultaneously 
in the pursuit of educational quality and equality of opportunity. While these ob-
jectives are in principle shared by everybody, in practice, the two sensitivities in 
dispute tend to focus on one of them almost to the point of excluding the other 
one.
Since LOGSE was passed, equality of opportunity has undoubtedly been the 
dominant goal of Spanish education policy. LOGSE raised the school leaving age 
from 14 to 16, and established a “comprehensive” school model with a single 
track for all pupils up to the end of the first cycle of secondary education. The 
law undoubtedly had a number of very positive aspects, such as making second-
ary education universal, thus bringing about a marked rise in the average level of 
education in Spain, and thereby contributing to social cohesion. However, the 
model it created did not manage to significantly reduce premature school-leaving 
and educational failure rates and has not prevented a gradual deterioration in the 
academic performance of Spanish students. 
There is a wide variety of opinions regarding the cause of this problem. Many 
people who defend the LOGSE model attribute its disappointing performance to 
the failure to fully deploy the support measures envisaged in the law due to a lack 
of resources. Its detractors, however, point to the difficulties involved in keeping 
pupils with different levels of performance and motivation, and very different im-
mediate aims, together in the same classroom up until the age of 16. Moreover, 
they maintain that the result has been to make the system less demanding so as to 
match the pace of the slower or less motivated pupils. Many people also criticise 
certain teaching approaches and curricular content, and complain of an excessive 
emphasis on equality at the expense of merit and effort. 
The review of some of the aspects of the literature given above suggests that 
there may be some truth in both of these explanations. It therefore helps to clarify 
the terms of the trade-off between quality and equality and also suggests certain 
lines of action that would make it possible to advance in both directions at once. 
An important conclusion is that corrective measures aimed at reducing the risk of 
failure among disadvantaged pupils need to be concentrated in the early stages of 
education. The demand for more resources is no doubt justified if these resources 
are devoted to extending coverage and improving the quality of the pre-school ed-
ucation system and to bolster primary education. At higher levels, however, these 
measures tend to be very expensive and rather ineffective. It also looks likely that 
it would be a good idea to abandon the single track through the final years of 
compulsory secondary education (ESO, in its Spanish initials). It is probably not 
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necessary to separate pupils by school, but it might make sense to put them in dif-
ferent classrooms at least part of the day. In this respect there is considerable room 
for adapting teaching to pupils’ needs, aptitudes and interests by adopting a more 
flexible curriculum that might include the option of studying a given subject at 
different levels of difficulty, as happens in some other countries (the “honors level” 
approach in the US, for example), as well as the establishment of different tracks 
with varying degrees of academic focus. 
Finally, many of the measures that the literature has identified as being desir-
able could help raise the performance of all pupil groups and do not, therefore, 
come into conflict with equity goals. It is worth emphasising here that it is im-
portant to think in terms of incentives of all the participants in the system and 
not just the quantities of inputs. To this end, one possibility that should be added 
to those discussed above would be that of informing students about the excelent 
economic reasons that exist for continuing their education. The empirical evi-
dence on the positive effects of education on wages and job opportunities is very 
strong, but many pupils, and even many parents, are unaware of it. It is therefore 
necessary to transmit the value of education to young people, convince them of 
the future benefits that making an effort and developing their talents can yield, 
and encourage them to recognise the incentives that exist to continue learning 
after they have completed their compulsory schooling. 
Another reform that might be desirable, for both equity and incentive reasons 
would be a considerable increase in university fees, accompanied by an expanded 
offer of grants and other aid linked both to income and/or academic perform-
ance. This would give students greater incentives not to unnecessarily prolong 
their university studies and help mitigate the regressive nature of a funding sys-
tem that transfers resources towards individuals with expected incomes that are 
well above those of the average taxpayer.
4 Labour market reform
As mentioned in the second section, two features of its labour market set Spain 
apart from other advanced economies.17 The first is a high unemployment rate, 
with significant volatility over the course of the economic cycle, which indicates 
that in both recessions and expansions the Spanish economy has a tendency to ad-
17 The paper by Jimeno (2008) highlights the main changes undergone by the Spanish labour market 
in recent decades in terms of labour supply and demand and social policies. The rising share of women in 
the labour force, better educated workers, the ageing of the labour force, immigration, greater international 
competition and globalisation are some of the changes observed in the Spanish labour market. Bentolila and 
Jimeno (2006) and the references in their paper are a good starting point for understanding how unemploy-
ment rates have varied over time in Spain.
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just in terms of quantities rather than prices. The second characteristic, which is 
related to the first, is that the temporary employment rate (i.e. the numbers of em-
ployees on temporary contracts as a proportion of the total work force) is much 
higher in Spain than in other European economies. 
What explains the high unemployment rate? There is an abundant empiri-
cal evidence available suggesting that the institutions regulating the labour mar-
ket have a highly significant impact on the level and persistance of employment 
rates and the extent of temporary work.18 Nickell, Nuziata and Ochel (2005) 
show that 55 per cent of the increase in the structural unemployment rate in 
OECD countries between the sixties and the nineties may be explained primari-
ly in terms of the changes in the labour market institutions that took place dur-
ing that period. The variables which the authors find have a significant effect 
include job protection, taxes, the type of collective bargaining, the level and du-
ration of unemployment benefits and increased union pressure. In a recent pa-
per, Gianella et al (2008) mainly confirm these results, finding that the level of 
regulation in the goods and services market, the levels of unionisation, and em-
ployment benefits play an important role in explaining the changes in NAIRU 
in the majority of OECD countries, including Spain. 
Of the set of variables that determine the performance of the job market, in 
this section we will focus on the characteristics of the Spanish economy that refer 
to collective bargaining, the two-tier labour market created by the difference in 
firing costs for temporary and permanent employees, and the regulation of goods 
and services markets. These are the areas that require the most urgent structural 
reforms to reduce the structural unemployment rate and the segmentation of the 
labour market.19
4.1 Reforming collective bargaining
In terms of collective bargaining Spain has a series of characteristics which make 
it somewhat different from other OECD countries. Firstly, although the degree of 
unionisation is among the lowest among the countries listed in Table 4.1.1, the 
share of the labour force covered by agreements determined by collective bargain-
ing is among the highest. Indeed, together with France and Greece, Spain has one 
of the biggest differences between the number of workers who participate actively 
in the bargaining process (through the unions they belong to) and those who are 
finally affected by the outcome of these negotiations.
18 See, for example, Blanchard (2006), Nickell (2006), OECD (2006), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), 
IMF (2003), and the bibliography they cite for an overview of the determinants of unemployment rates in 
the OECD countries. 
19 An assessment of the effects of taxation on employment in Spain can be found in Boscá, Doménech 
and Ferri (2009), and the references they cite.
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Along with the issue of how well the collective bargaining process represents 
workers, another problem is that, as Estrada and Melguizo (2008) argue, the col-
lective bargaining agreements that have been put in place since 1997 have pro-
duced a situation in which in most cases wages are negotiated at the sector/prov-
ince level rather than at the firm level. This is despite the various labour reforms 
that the Spanish economy has undergone since the mid-eighties and the recogni-
tion of some of the problems brought by extending the scope of collective bar-
gaining agreements.
As can be seen in Chart 4.1.1, the percentage of workers whose wages are 
negotiated at firm level has been on a downward trend since the early eight-
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ies, reaching an average of just over 11 per cent in recent years. In common 
with Germany, the dominant wage bargaining level in Spain is the sector with-
in each region, in contrast with other countries where wage negotiations are 
either national or firm level (particularly in the US and UK), as can be seen in 
Table 4.1.2.
These data suggest that Spain has an intermediate degree of centralisation of 
collective bargaining. Given that, according to Calmfors and Driffil’s (1998) the-
oretical results, there is a U-shaped relationship between the degree of centralisa-
tion and unemployment, the type of collective bargaining that predominates in 
Spain is less favourable in terms of job creation and unemployment than that in 
the Nordic countries (national) or Anglosaxon countries (where, with the excep-
tion of Ireland, the firm level predominates). Nevertheless, in empirical terms, 
using data for the OECD, Thomas (2002) finds that although wages are more 
sensitive to unemployment in countries with centralised collective bargaining, 
they are less sensitive to firm-specific factors (such as changes in relative prices 
and productivity) and this means unemployment rates end up being higher than 
in those countries where wages are negotiated at the firm level.  
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One of the consequences of the fact that the dominant level for wage negotia-
tions is not the firm is the smaller correlation between wage growth and produc-
tivity growth in Spain as compared with other countries where salaries are more 
responsive to firms production conditions. Using the results obtained by García 
(2009), a way of illustrating this implication of wage negotiations is to analyse the 
distribution of annual growth rates of wages and productivity in Spain, and com-
pare them with those of other countries in which wages are mainly negotiated at 
company level (United Kingdom). Although, ideally, the best way of doing this ex-
ercise would be to have information for a sample of firms that is sufficiently repre-
sentative of national output, the absence of uniform information across countries 
means it is only possible to perform this analysis with aggregate sector data. For this 
purpose data for the period 1996 to 2005 from the EU KLEMS database on 56 
productive sectors has been used (see Ark, O’Mahony and Timmer, 2008).
Charts 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 show the estimated density functions for the real pro-
ductivity growth rates and wage growth rates (560 observations, corresponding 
to the 56 sectors and 10 years covered by the sample used). As can be seen, the 
density function of annual wage growth in Spain is more closely concentrated 
around the mean (i.e. has a lower variance) than productivity growth. This find-
ing contrasts with the evidence seen in the United Kingdom, where the two den-
sity functions are practically identical. In fact, when testing if both distributions 
are the same, the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test rejects the null hypothesis of equality 
in the case of Spain by a wide margin (the statistic is equal to 0.116 with a sig-
nificance level close to zero), while for the United Kingdom it is accepted with a 
probability of 77.7 per cent (the statistic is 0.038).
SOURCE: SEE BBVA from EU KLEMS.
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These results suggest that when the dominant level of wage negotiations 
is not the firm, as is the case in Spain, there is greater salary compression, such 
that wage growth presents less variance and less of a correlation with productiv-
ity growth, thus confirming the findings of Pagán and Sánchez-Sánchez (2008), 
who, using the 2002 Structure of Earnings Survey (Encuesta de Estructuras Sal-
ariales) data, found that firm-level agreements are those with a higher correlation 
between productivity and salaries, in line with the evidence given by Card and de 
la Rica (2006).
According to Thomas’s (2002) findings cited above, one of the implications of 
these results is that as wages are less sensitive to firm performance, employment is 
the adjustment variable. This evidence therefore suggests it is necessary to reform 
collective bargaining in Spain to bring it more in line with that in countries in 
which unemployment rates are lower and wage growth is more closely related to 
productivity growth. This reform does not imply renouncing collective bargain-
ing on three levels (national, sector, and firm), but appropriately limiting the type 
of items to be negotiated on each of them. 
At the national level it makes sense to agree those aspects which affect all 
workers and firms equally, regardless of the sector or market they operate in: 
e.g. agreements to improve the system for training workers, to reduce un-
employment rates, avoid the two-tier structure of temporary and permanent 
workers, to improve and simplify labour legislation, to increase the efficiency 
of the tax system or to ensure the future sustainability of the pension system. 
At sector level only those issues that affect all the firms in an industry equally 
should be negotiated, such as health and safety, or working conditions in the 
SOURCE: SEE BBVA from EU KLEMS. 
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sector. Finally, salary and organisation issues (such as working hours, func-
tional and geographical mobility), which have an impact on the efficiency 
and competitiveness of each individual firm, should be negotiated at the firm 
level.
Another important issue that should be taken into account in collective 
negotiations in Spain is avoiding the general applicability of collective agree-
ments. This would prevent the application of agreements to firms and workers 
that are not formally represented at higher levels of collective bargaining, un-
less they voluntarily decide to opt-in to one of the supra-firm level agreements 
for a specific period. In line with this proposal, the OECD (2008) suggests the 
more widespread use of opt-out clauses at sub-national levels for negotiation. 
This would improve the extent to which workers are represented at lower levels 
and enhance the sensitivity of negotiated components to firm performance. 
4.2 High rates of temporary employment
Another of the specific features of the Spanish labour market is that the share 
of temporary employment is much higher than in other European countries. As 
Jimeno (2008) argued, labour reforms in Spain (1984, 1992-93, 1994, 1997, 
2001 and 2006) have not produced sufficient flexibility or contained the explo-
sion in temporary contracts that began in the mid 1960s. As Table 4.2.1 shows, 
the rate of temporary employment in Spain in 2007 (31.9 per cent) was, by a 
wide margin, the highest among the OECD countries, more than doubling the 
OECD average (14.6 percent) or that of the 15 European Union countries (14.8 
percent). 
Apart from the problems of equity that this produces, the high rate of tem-
porary employment that exists in Spain increases the sensitivity of unemploy-
ment to the economic cycle. In recessions such as the current one, the jobs 
that tend to be lost first are the temporary ones, making the temporary em-
ployment rate pro-cyclical. The prevalence of temporary contracts also has 
a negative impact on productivity (Dolado and Stucchi, 2008), as it affects 
firm’s decisions to provide ongoing training and workers’ decisions to accumu-
late physical and human capital, and even on women’s fertility rates (de la Rica 
and Iza, 2006). 
As in many other economic spheres, this split between temporary and per-
manent employees is the result of the response to the incentives and restrictions 
existing in the Spanish labour market. These have made it difficult to reconcile 
the flexibility firms need to adapt to changing competitive and productive en-
vironments with the security that workers demand to ensure their continuity 
in their jobs. Balancing these opposing forces has given rise to an inefficient 
system, according to which, in the event of unfair dismissal (which in practice 
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covers virtually all redundancies), temporary workers are entitled to a severance 
pay of just 8 days per year worked, whereas employees on “employment promo-
tion” contracts (a special scheme intended to convert temporary contracts into 
permanent ones) are entitled to 33 days’ pay and those on permanent contracts 
to 45 days’ pay per year worked (Chart 4.2.1).
To put an end to this two-tier labour market, the reform should bring all 
new jobs in a single type of contract, such that firing costs are linked to length 
of service without the current discontinuities. Instead of the intervals that cur-
rently exist, the new contract should produce a continuous relationship in 
which firing costs increase gradually with the time the employee has worked for 
the firm.20 One way of achieving this relationship between job duration and the 
cost of dismissal would be to set up a dismissal fund, such as that which exists in 
Austria, where the firm and the worker contribute part of their wages to a fund, 
1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007
Spain 29.8 35.0 32.1 33.3 34.4 31.9
Portugal 18.3 10.0 20.4 19.5 20.2 22.2
Netherlands 7.6 10.9 14.0 15.2 16.2 18.0
Sweeden ... ... 15.2 15.8 16.8 17.5
Finland ... ... 16.5 16.6 16.4 16.0
Germany 10.5 10.4 12.7 13.7 14.1 14.2
Japan 10.6 10.5 12.5 14.0 14.3 13.9
France 10.5 12.3 15.5 13.3 13.4 13.7
Italy 5.2 7.2 10.1 12.4 13.0 13.4
Greece 16.6 10.2 13.1 ... ... ...
Switzerland ... 13.1 11.7 13.0 13.6 13.0
Canada ... ... 12.5 13.2 13.0 12.9
Norway ... ... 9.3 9.5 10.1 9.5
Denmark 10.8 12.1 10.2 9.9 9.6 9.1
Ireland 8.5 10.2 4.7 2.6 4.2 9.0
Austria ... 6.0 7.9 9.1 9.0 8.9
Belgium 5.3 5.3 9.0 9.1 8.9 8.8
United Kingdom 5.2 7.0 6.8 5.5 5.6 5.8
USA ... 5.1 ... 4.2 ... ...
EU-15 10.4 11.4 13.5 14.1 14.6 14.8
OECD 10.6 9.9 13.9 10.8 14.3 14.6
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT RATE. OECD, 1990-2007  TABLE 4.2.1 
SOURCE: OECD, Stat. 
20 A contract of this kind, in which severance pay increases gradually and continuously in line with the 
employee’s length of service, has also been put forward by Bentolila, Dolado and Jimeno (2008). These au-
thors show that a contract with 8, 12, 15, 20 and 25 days severance pay for each of the first five years and 36 
days as of the sixth year would produce a redundancy payment equivalent to of the current system paid to a 
worker who has worked for the firm for 10 years.
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which is used in the case of dismissal, and which workers can take with them if 
they change job (see OECD, 2006). 
4.3 Reforms in the goods and services market
As is well known, the rate of structural employment is simultaneously de-
termined by the market power of workers in the labour market and the market 
power of firms in the goods and services market (see Andrés, 1993 and Layard, 
Nickell and Jackman, 2005). Recognising this characteristic of the labour market 
means that in order to reduce unemployment it will be necessary to undertake 
reforms in the goods and services markets as well as undertake a series of labour 
market reforms such as those described above. 
Recent empirical evidence on the need to undertake reforms to promote 
employment growth is fairly conclusive. For example, Gianella et al (2008) 
confirm results previously reported in the literature (see, for example, the work 
of Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003, Fonseca, et al, 2001, and the references in 
OECD, 2006), finding that the OECD indicator that approximates regula-
tions restricting competition in seven sectors (gas, electricity, postal services, 
telecommunications, air transport, rail and road transport) has a statistically 
significant and economically important effect on structural unemployment 
rates in the OECD countries.21 Indeed, according to these authors the variable 
having greatest impact on the reduction of NAIRU in Spain over the period 
SOURCES: Eurostat and SEE BBVA. 
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1992-2003 is precisely the regulation of goods markets, where improvements 
over this period as a result of greater competition explain slightly more than 
50 per cent of the reduction in the structural unemployment rate. Using an 
alternative method based on specifying and calibrating a general equilibrium 
model with unemployment and imperfect competition in the goods market, 
Ebel and Haefke (2008) find that deregulating goods markets can fully explain 
the drop in structural unemployment in the United States between the eighties 
and nineties. 
Chart 4.3.1 illustrates the correlation that exists between the indicator for 
regulation in the goods market constructed by the OECD (referring to 2003) 
and the structural unemployment rate in 2005.22 As can be seen, those coun-
tries in which this indicator is highest (least competition in goods markets) 
have a higher structural unemployment rate (the correlation between the two 
variables is 0.57).
Chart 4.3.2 examines the correlation between the unemployment rate and the 
average of the standardised values of the World Bank’s Doing Business variables, 
which refer to how easy it is to start a business (number of procedures, time and 
cost), to handle permits and to conduct foreign trade. Again we observe that 
those countries which impose higher business start-up and running costs have 
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22 The OECD has recently published the 2008 results for this indicator (see Wölfl et al, 2009), in 
which there is a clear relative improvement in Spain’s position between 2003 and 2008, above all in the do-
mestic economic regulation index and, to a lesser extent, in that of administrative regulation. Despite this, 
Spain is still a long way behind the countries with the best regulatory environments. Given that no results 
are available for this indicator in 2008 for some of the countries in the sample, and as the effects of goods-
market reforms on the labour market are not immediate, Chart 4.3.1 uses 2003 levels, which are more close-
ly correlated to the structural unemployment rate in 2005.
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higher rates of structural unemployment (the correlation between the two vari-
ables is 0.57).23
This evidence highlights the need to simultaneously reform the labour mar-
ket and the goods and services market, by making progress towards market 
liberalisation, increasing competition and improving regulations to promote 
business activity and reduce administrative costs. The improvements in busi-
ness efficiency and goods markets competition will therefore have an impact 
on reducing unemployment rates. In this regard, an ambitious implementation 
of the EU’s Services Directive would be a good opportunity to make decisive 
progress in this direction.
4.4 Other measures
The structural improvements the Spanish economy needs in order to raise 
employment rates undoubtedly do not end with the measures discussed in the 
preceding sections. With common regulations and institutions at national level, 
there is a high degree of heterogeneity in the employment rates across Spain’s re-
gions and provinces. It therefore seems evident that it is necessary to eliminate 
the incentives that set up obstacles to workers’ geographical mobility, and which 
are preventing the differences in employment rates from disappearing. In this 
regard, as the empirical evidence shows, the relationship between housing poli-
cies, workers’ geographical mobility and how easy it is to rent a home is crucial. 
For example, Bassanini and Duval (2006) find that a third of the variance of the 
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23 The correlation between the goods market regulation indicator constructed by the OECD and the 
Doing Business indicator is 0.74.
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fixed effects estimated using a standard regression of the unemployment rate for a 
panel of OECD countries between 1982 and 2003 seems to be explained by the 
average percentage of homeownership (Spain has the second highest percentage 
rate of home ownership in the OECD). Therefore, in order to increase the mo-
bility of the labour factor and reduce the huge disparities in unemployment rates 
between provinces, it would seem timely to encourage rented property, not with 
more tax incentives, but by strengthening the legal position of landlords, so as 
to create genuine incentives for the large numbers of unoccupied properties that 
currently exist to be offered on the rented property market. 
Another aspect which is linked to regulations that hinder business activity 
(and also create a disincentive to foreign investment) is that of the administrative 
costs they have to face due to the lack of a true internal market and the complex-
ity of the tangle of regulations, which differs from one Autonomous Community 
to another. Re-establishing a genuine internal market does not require that the 
Autonomous Communities renounce their competencies over trade, but does re-
quire that they coordinate them in a national commission bringing together all 
the actors and institutions involved, in order to simplify the current dispersed 
and heterogeneous legislation into a single, simplified regulatory framework. 
5 The pensions system and the aging challenge
Pensions currently constitute one of the biggest public spending items in 
most advanced countries. For obvious reasons, it is also one of the elements of 
the welfare state that is most sensitive to ageing. The problem is particularly seri-
ous in those countries which, like Spain, have an unfunded system with defined 
benefits, in which pensions are financed by current contributions from workers 
(“pay-as-you-go”) and their levels are set in advance without reference to actuarial 
sustainability criteria.
The topic has received considerable attention in Spain. Going back over a dec-
ade, a number of studies have approached the problem from different perspec-
tives. Practically all of them, however, agree on the seriousness of the challenge 
and on the need for urgent reforms in the field.24
24 The literature on the sustainability of the Spanish pensions system is extensive. There was an ini-
tial wave of studies on the topic in the second half of the nineties, including among others, MTSS (1995), 
Barea et al (1995, 1996 and 1997), Herce et al (1996), Boldrin et al (1999), Jimeno and Lisandro (1999), 
Jimeno (2000), Herce and Alonso (2000) and Montero (2000). Later works include Alonso and Herce 
(2003), da Rocha and Lores (2005), Díaz Saavedra (2005), Ahn et al (2005), Balmaseda et al (2006), Díaz 
Giménez and Díaz Saavedra (2006 and 2008), Conde and Alonso (2006), EPC (2006), Gil et al (2007), 
Jimeno, Rojas and Puente (2008), MTIN (2008), Doménech and Melguizo (2008) and Moral-Arce et al 
(2008).
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Drawing upon this literature, this section will insist on the same message once 
again. After reviewing the evolution of pension spending over the last few dec-
ades, we project the future path of this variable over the next half century starting 
out from the most recent demographic scenarios and using a simple model of 
pension expenditure. Finally, this model is also used to obtain a tentative estimate 
of the possible impact of various reforms that will serve as the basis for our policy 
recommendations.
5.1.  Evolution of the revenues and expenditures 
of the contributory pension system, 1981-2007
This section analyses the evolution of the revenues and expenditures of 
Spain’s public pension system over the last three decades. The data we have 
used correspond to spending on contributory Social Security pensions. We 
have obtained data on the number of pensions paid each month between 1981 
and 2007 and on their average amount from the Ministry of Labour (MITIN, 
2008a) website. These data are broken down by pension type (retirement, dis-
ability, and survivors’ pensions). For 1998-2007 they come from the Labour 
Statistics Bulletin (Boletín de Estadísticas Laborales, MITIN, 2008b), while for 
previous years average amounts are taken from the 2000 and 2007 editions of 
the INSS Statistics Report (Informe Estadístico, various years).
Total pension expenditure is estimated by multiplying the average number 
of pensions due each year by their average value (obtained by multiplying the 
monthly amount by fourteen).25 The calculation is performed separately for each 
type of pension and the results aggregated. We also checked that the total ob-
tained in this way approximately matches the figure given in the General State 
Budget for this item. 
In Spain, ordinary social-security contributions cover a series of contingen-
cies apart from retirement, making it theoretically impossible to isolate a specific 
contribution to the pension system. Based on an internal report by the Span-
ish government cited by Doménech and Melguizo (2008), we estimate that 95% 
of social-security contributions are allocated to the pension system.26 In recent 
years, social security contributions have been supplemented by a growing contri-
bution by the State, which has gradually taken on the financing of the so-called 
“minimum complements”, which bring the lowest contributory pensions up to 
25 The total number of current pensions is greater than the number of pensioner because a given individu-
al may receive more than one pension. Pension payments are doubled in the months of July and December.
26 According to the report cited by Doménech and Melguizo (2008), income from social-security con-
tributions paid in to the pension system came to 8.6% of GDP in 2006. We have calculated the ratio be-
tween this amount and the total social-security contributions for ordinary risks (including those correspond-
ing to the unemployed), which in this year came to 8.98% of GDP.
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the legally established minimum. Our data on the system’s income are drawn 
from the Economic and financial report included in the Social Security system’s 
general budget (Informe Económico-Financiero de los Presupuestos Generales de la 
Seguridad Social) for the 2009 financial year and from the Annex to that docu-
ment (MITIN, 2008d).
Data on GDP, employment and population disaggregated by age are taken 
from the INE website (2008b and 2008d). The INE provides two series of Na-
tional Accounts data, one for 1995-2007 with 2000 as the base year, and an-
other for 1980-95, with 1986 as the base year.27 We have spliced the two series 
by extending the more recent one back in time and using the growth rates of 
the older series.
Chart 5.1.1 shows how Spain’s spending on contributory pensions has pro-
gressed as a share of GDP, together with the income the pension system is esti-
mated to receive on current criteria, including 95% of contributions for ordinary 
risks and the state’s contribution to finance minimum pension complements. The 
expenditure series shows a growing trend up to 1996, when a peak of 8.51% of 
GDP was reached. From this year on a gentle reduction has been observed, fall-
ing to 7.43% in 2007. The income series does not show a clear trend, although 
there have been considerable variations.
The chart should be interpreted with caution as the State has gradually 
been taking on the financing of important benefits which previously, at least 
in part, were paid for by the Social Security system (including part of health-
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CHART 5.1.1  
27 In the most recent series, the employment variable corresponds to full-time equivalent work. In the 
1980-95 series this is not clear, but the series seems to refer to “gross” employment rather than full-time 
equivalent employment.
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care and non-contributory pensions). Strictly speaking, therefore, the vertical 
distance between the two series can only be interpreted as the surplus or defi-
cit of the public pension system in very recent years. However, in any case, 
it gives us an idea of the way in which its financial situation has evolved. In 
the mid-nineties the system was approximately in equilibrium. In recent years, 
however, a reduction in spending has made it possible to build up a reserve 
fund which had accumulated 45,716 million euros (4.35% of GDP) by the 
end of 2007.
5.1.1 The evolution of spending
In order to analyse the dynamics of pension spending as a share of GDP, 
it is useful to break this indicator down into a series of factors that capture 
the influence of demographics, employment and the generosity of the pension 
system.28
Let PEXP be total pension expenditure. The ratio between this variable and 
GDP can be expressed in the following way:
 NPENSEP GENNPENS
L
L
GDP *
= =NPENSGDP
PEXP
PEXP
=
L
NPENS
Q
AVPENS  [6]
where NPENS is the number of pensions being drawn and L is total employ-
ment. Therefore, pension expenditure as a share of GDP is equal to the product 
of the number of pensions per employed person (NPENSEP) and an indicator 
(GEN) of the “generosity” of average labour pension, measured by the ratio be-
tween this variable (AVPENS) and average labour productivity (Q). It is conven-
ient to rewrite the first term of the decomposition as follows:
 COV DEP EMP
L L * *
= =NPENSNPENSEP =
N65+ N1864
N65+NPENS N1864  [7]
where N65+ and N1864 refer to the population aged over 64 and the popula-
tion between 18 and 64 respectively. Therefore, the number of pensioners per 
worker can be expressed as the product of these three factors: the pension cov-
erage ratio (COV = number of pensions per person of retirement age), old age 
dependency ratio (DEP = number of people over 64 for each person of working 
28 This type of decomposition has often been used in the literature. See, for example, Jimeno, Rojas 
and Puente (2008) and Doménech and Melguizo (2008).
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age) and the inverse of the employment rate among the working-age population 
(EMP).29 Finally, combining [6] and [7], we obtain
 DEP EMP COV
GDP * *
PEXP = * GEN  [8]
Chart 5.1.2 breaks down the pension expenditure indicator (PEXP/GDP) into 
its two main components: the number of pensions per person in employment 
and the average pension expressed as a fraction of output per worker, both nor-
malised by their initial values. The first of these components is in turn disaggre-
gated into various factors in Chart 5.1.3.
The charts show that pension spending over the last few decades has been 
dominated by two main factors: adverse demography and the generally favour-
able performance of the labour market. The demographic effect, which is cap-
tured by the dependency ratio (DEP), was negative except in the final years of 
the sample, when the strong migratory influx Spain experienced during this 
period translated into a gentle decline in the dependency ratio, temporarily in-
verting this variable’s clear upward trend. Also, the employment rate among the 
working age population showed an upward trend throughout most of the pe-
riod, thus generating a positive effect on employment (EMP), which softened 
the negative effect of the demographic factor. In the last third of the sample 
period, rapid employment creation, combined with strong immigration, even 
29 In turn, EMP can be broken down into two new factors reflecting the inverse of the labour force 
participation rate and the inverse of the labour force employment rate.
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allowed a noticeable reduction in expenditure as a share of GDP. As we shall 
see, however, all the signs suggest that this was just a short-lived respite within 
a continuing upward trend in expenditure which will be irreversible unless sig-
nificant changes are made to the design of the pension system.
As regards the rest of the components of pension expenditure, we see a gentle 
increase in the indicator of the generosity of average pensions (GEN), while the 
coverage ratio (COV) has tended to remain fairly constant, with no clear trend or 
large oscillations.
5.2 Demographic and employment scenarios for 2007-60
The data we have just reviewed suggest that population ageing is already hav-
ing a substantial effect on pension expenditure and that the acceleration of this 
process over the coming decades could jeopardise the viability of the system. 
In order to try to get an idea of the potential magnitude of the problem 
which we are likely to have to face in the future, we will forecast pension spend-
ing over the period 2008-2060 under the assumption that there are no signifi-
cant changes to the system’s current structure. As our starting point, in this 
section we will construct a variety of scenarios for the demographic and employ-
ment components of pension expenditure. In each case we will prepare three 
forecasts: a baseline scenario, an “optimistic” (minimum expenditure) scenario 
and a “pessimistic” scenario. 
5.2.1 Demographic scenarios
Our starting point in this analysis is the demographic scenario recently con-
structed by Eurostat for Spain (Europop, 2008). Eurostat’s baseline scenario for 
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Spain envisages a gradual decline in net immigration (down from more than 
600,000 people a year in 2008 to less than 150,000 from 2040), a slight recovery 
in the fertility rate (from 1.39 children per woman in 2008 to 1.56 in 2060) and 
a rapid increase in life expectancy (by 7.5 years for men and 5.7 years for women 
over the same period). The result is a rapid process of ageing. On this hypothesis, 
the old age dependency ratio (defined as the ratio of the population aged 65+ to 
the population aged 18-64) will increase rapidly over the next five decades, from 
0.25 in 2008 to 0.62 in 2060.
In addition to Eurostat’s central scenario, we will also consider two alterna-
tive scenarios with a view to delimiting the range of possibilities. The first (with-
out immigration or pessimistic), also prepared by Eurostat, is identical to the base-
line scenario except that here it is assumed that the flow of immigrants is zero 
throughout the period. The result is a sharp acceleration in the ageing process, 
with an additional increase of 15 percentage points in the estimated dependency 
ratio at the end of the period, which reaches a value of 0.77 in 2060.
The third (optimistic) scenario modifies two of the hypotheses of Eurostat’s base-
line scenario in the opposite direction to the second scenario. Firstly, the net flow of 
immigrants is increased by 50% in each of the years in the sample, assuming that 
the new entrants are uniformly distributed over the 20 to 29 year age range. Sec-
ondly, we have increased the gross fertility rate implicit in the baseline scenario30 by 
10%. With these changes the dependency ratio in 2060 would be 0.54.31
30 The construction of this scenario is described in more detail in Annex 2, section 1.
31 INE has recently published (January 2009) a projection of the Spanish population over the next ten 
years. This scenario is similar to Eurostat’s baseline scenario, although somewhat more pessimistic regarding 
the future evolution of immigration.
30 
35 
40 
45 
50 
55 
60 
65 
70 
2008 2013 2018 2023 2028 2033 2038 2043 2048 2053 2058 
  BASELINE  WITHOUT IMMIGRATION   OPTIMISTIC 
PROJECTIONS OF SPAIN’S TOTAL POPULATION CHART 5.2.1  
Ageing and real convergence: challenges and proposals  237
Ángel de la Fuente and Rafael Dom
énech
Charts 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 show the expected variation in the total Spanish 
population and the old-age dependency ratio (population aged 65+/18-64) in 
each of the three scenarios, with the second variable normalised using its value 
in 2008 (0.252). The baseline scenario implies the virtual stagnation of Spain’s 
population after 2020, whereas a complete halt to immigration would imply 
that this variable would start to decline immediately. As we have seen, the de-
pendency ratio would be doubled in the best case and could be tripled over the 
next half century.
5.2.2 Employment scenarios
The share of GDP taken up by pension expenditure is also very sensitive to vari-
ations in the employment rate. In this section we project the value of this variable 
over the period of interest, starting from the (full-time equivalent) employment se-
ries given above, which have been constructed by linking the two CNE series. We 
will therefore work with the employment rate of the working-age population de-
fined as the ratio of total equivalent employment to the population aged 18-64.
Employment is a more difficult variable to predict than population as it does not 
have the latter’s inertia. Therefore, the exercise undertaken here is much riskier than 
the one in the previous section. Given our aims, however, it is not essential that the 
employment forecast be very precise. Basically, we will settle for a reasonable bound 
on the degree to which favourable developments on employment front can mitigate 
the adverse effects of ageing on the public pension system. Our basic hypothesis will 
therefore be rather optimistic: we will assume that the aggregate employment rate 
continues on the positive trend it has displayed over the last two decades and tends to 
gradually converge on the male employment rate in 2007 (a good year) in Spain or 
SOURCES: Eurostat. Population projections, Europop 2008 and author’s own calculations. 
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some other country with more favourable ratios than ours. We will also try, however, 
to take into account the possible effects of the current crisis on the coming years.
We will therefore start out with the employment rate observed in 2007 
(65.16%) and project it in to the future using the procedure described below. 
The employment rate forecasts for the population in the 18-64 age range 
for 2008-10 have been obtained by combining the employment forecasts in 
the recently updated Stability Plan (Plan de Estabilidad para España; MEH, 
2009) with the baseline demographic scenario. That is to say, the employment 
rate in each year is obtained by dividing the employment envisaged in MEH 
(2009) by the 18-64 population envisaged in Eurostat’s central demographic 
scenario. The value of the employment rate estimated in this way is used in 
the three employment scenarios for the years 2008-10. (What changes from 
one scenario to the next, once they have been combined with the correspond-
ing demographic scenario, is the change in population, so that by maintaining 
the employment rate constant, we will be varying the total volume of employ-
ment).
For 2011 onwards, we have proceeded as follows: On the baseline scenario the 
employment rate recovers its 2007 level in 5 years (in 2015) with uniform annual 
increments. After 2015 the employment rate converges at an annual rate of 4% 
towards the employment rate for Spanish males aged between 16 and 64 in 2007 
(which was 77.4%), a similar level to that currently seen in the population as a 
whole in Japan, the Nordic countries, Canada and the US.
To this central scenario we have added an “optimistic” and a “pessimistic” sce-
nario. In the first case, we assume that the recovery in employment in the wake of 
the current crisis takes four years (rather than five) and that, starting in 2014, the 
employment rate converges on its long-term level at a rate of 4% a year, but now 
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taking the employment rate among Dutch males in 2007 (82.3%), the highest in 
the EU that year, as the reference. Finally, in the pessimistic scenario, we assume 
that after an initial drop, the employment rate remains constant in 2011 (at the 
2010 level) and that the recovery of the 2007 level now takes six years from 2011. 
In this case, the long-term reference is again the employment rate for Spanish 
males, but the rate of convergence is reduced by half (to 2% a year). 
Chart 5.2.3 summarises the results of the exercise. On the baseline scenario, 
the employment rate increases by 16% between 2007 and 2060. This increase 
shrinks to 11% in the more pessimistic scenario and rises to 22% in the most 
optimistic scenario.
5.2.3 The combined effects of demography and employment
By combining the results of the preceding two sections, it is possible to con-
struct a sort of confidence interval for the number of people of retirement age per 
employed person. Firstly, we have combined both baseline scenarios. To construct 
the interval around this central projection we have combined the two pessimistic 
scenarios in one case and the two optimistic ones in the other. 
Chart 5.2.4 shows the results. Combining the demographic and employment 
factors (but keeping the unit cost or generosity element constant), our baseline 
forecast suggests that pension expenditure as a share of GDP will more than dou-
ble between 2007 and 2060. In the most optimistic scenario, the increase in this 
expenditure item will fall to 74%, while in the most pessimistic scenario pension 
expenditure will almost triple.
Table 5.2.3 summarises the results of the last three sections. On the base-
line scenario, ceteris paribus, the ageing of the population will translate into an 
increase in pension spending as a share of GDP of 146.3% between 2007 and 
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2060. Moreover, the forecast increase in employment will subtract 15.7 points 
from this amount, leaving the envisaged increase in spending at 112.9%. In the 
more optimistic scenario, the increase in spending will be reduced by as much 
as 74.6%, while in the most pessimistic case it will be increased by 174.8%. 
5.2.4 The evolution of total employment
Another interesting piece of data that can be obtained by combining the de-
mographic and employment scenarios is the total volume of (full-time equiva-
lent) employment. As we shall see below, the rate of growth of this aggregate is 
crucial for the sustainability of the pension system. 
Obs 2007 Optimistic Baseline Pessimistic
Old-age dependency ratio 0.2531 213.2 246.3 304.6
Employment rate (population 18-64) 0.6516 122.1 115.7 110.8
Old people per employed person 0.3884 174.6 212.9 274.8
DEMOGRAPHIC AND EMPLOYMENT COMPONENTS OF PENSION 
EXPENDITURE 
(OBSERVED VALUES IN 2007 AND EXPECTED VALUES IN 2060, 2007=100)
  
TABLE 5.2.3
 
Obs 2007 Pessimistic Baseline Optimistic
Total employment 19,071,800 67.6 106.4 149.8
Average annual growth rate -0.74% 0.12% 0.76%
ENVISAGED EMPLOYMENT GROWTH 
(OBSERVED VALUES IN 2007 AND EXPECTED VALUES IN 2060, 2007 = 100)
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Chart 5.2.5 shows the envisaged course of employment between 2007 and 
2060 in each of the scenarios. Table 5.2.4 summarises the initial and final values 
and also shows the average rate of growth of equivalent employment in each case 
for the period as a whole.
5.3 A simple model of pension spending
Section 2 of Annex 2 sketches a simple accounting model of pension spending in 
an economy in which salary growth is exogenous. The model uses highly simplified 
assumptions, including lifetimes with non-stochastic durations and constant rates of 
employment and productivity growth, it ignores agents’ heterogeneity and the en-
dogeneity of decisions to enter or exit the labour market and does not take into ac-
count some important characteristics of the Spanish system, including the existence 
of ceilings and floors on the base for pension contributions. It is not, therefore, a 
detailed or realistic model that tries to capture all the relevant variables when pro-
jecting pension spending or analysing the impact of possible reforms of the system. 
Nevertheless, we believe that it is a useful complement to the aggregate accounting 
model that we are using because it introduces a degree of discipline when projecting 
into the future the generosity component of pension expenditure (i.e. the ratio be-
tween the average pension and labour productivity). Used with care, the model can 
also be used to construct a first estimate of the impact of various possible reforms on 
the long-term sustainability of the system.
The model assumes that the pension calculation period (N), the number of 
years over which contributions are paid (C) and the period during which a re-
tirement or surviving spouse’s pension is drawn (X and X2) remain constant 
over time. It also assumes constant rates of employment and population growth 
(n) and average wage growth (g), a wage premium for experience that grows 
exponentially with the number of years worked (also at a constant rate, ) and 
a constant rate of contributions (). For the given values of these parameters, 
and applying the rules for pension calculations defined in the current Span-
ish legislation (see section 3 of Annex 2), the model enables us to calculate the 
ratio between the average pension and average wages, the IRR (internal rate 
of return) of the contributory pension system, the total income and expenses 
of the system, and therefore its financial balance. Finally, the model offers a 
simple characterisation of the financial sustainability of the pension system: it 
is sustainable in the long term if and only if its IRR does not exceed the rate of 
growth of aggregate wages (g+n).
5.3.1 Parameterising the model
When applying this model in combination with our demographic and em-
ployment scenarios, we have to take into account the fact that it is basically a 
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steady-state model and is unable to reflect the dynamics induced by changes in 
the values of these parameters. Consequently, what we will do is set the values 
of the parameters of the model by taking as a reference the average values of the 
variables of interest during the period 2007-60 in each of the scenarios we are 
considering and over the period 1981-2007.
Table 5.3.1.1 summarises the main data. For 1980-2007, g and n are set equal 
to the average rates of productivity growth per (full-time equivalent) employed 
person and total employment, according to the CNE data referred to above. Both 
rates have been calculated by regressing the logarithm of the corresponding vari-
able on a linear trend. In the case of productivity, our base assumption for 2007-
60 is that the average rate of growth observed from 1980-2007 will remain con-
stant into the future. The value of g in the optimistic and pessimistic scenario is 
set equal to the average rate of productivity growth (calculated by the same pro-
cedure) over the periods from 1980-95 and 1995-2007, respectively. In the case 
of employment, the value of n for 2007-60 in each scenario s is set equal to the 
average growth rate of employment envisaged in it. This variable is not estimated, 
rather it is calculated directly from current employment and that envisaged at the 
end of the period, using
n 
53
s
s s
= ln L – ln L2060 2007
where Lst is the employment forecast in period t under scenario s.
The average number of years over which pensioners have paid contributions 
is estimated as the product of the average employment rate among the popula-
tion aged 18-64 in the relevant scenario (calculated as the average of their annu-
al values) and the theoretical maximum duration of the individual’s working life, 
2007-2060
Baseline Optimistic Pessimistic
Growth in output per worker (g) 1.13% 1.13% 1.70% 0.39%
Total employment growth (n) 1.90% 0.12% 0.76% -0.74%
Average employment rate 18-64 56.03% 70.33% 72.87% 67.90%
Average years contributions (C) 26.34 33.05 34.25 31.91
Life expectancy
Population as a whole 76.66 85.9 85.9 85.9
Men 73.37 83.5 83.5 83.5
Women 79.93 88.3 88.3 88.3
X = years drawing retirement pension 11.66 20.90 20.90 20.90
X2= additional years surviving spouse's pension 6.02 5.15 5.15 5.15
1980-2007
PARAMETERISATION OF THE MODEL ON VARIOUS SCENARIOS TABLE 5.3.1  
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65 – 18 = 47 years. The period during which a pension is drawn is calculat-
ed as the difference between the average life expectancy of the population as a 
whole (taking its average value during the relevant period) and the retirement 
age (which is set to be equal to the legal retirement age of 65 years). The pe-
riod during which a surviving spouse’s pension is drawn is estimated as being 
the difference between the life expectancy of women and the population as a 
whole, incremented by 2.75 years, which is the average difference in age be-
tween men and women at the time of marriage according to the INE’s marriage 
statistics (2008c). For the period 1980-2007, the average value of life expect-
ancy at birth between 1975 and 2005 has been taken. For the period 2007-60 
we have taken the average of the values of this variable for 2005 and 2060. The 
latter is estimated by adding to the value observed in 2005 the increase in life 
expectancy forecast by Eurostat in its population scenario (which is our base-
line scenario). The probability () that a retiree is survived by a spouse entitled 
to a survivor’s pension is set at ½.
The experience premium ( = 1.26%) is set so that the model reproduces the 
ratio between the initial retirement pension (under the general social security sys-
tem) and the average salary observed in 2007. The average salary is taken from 
the EES (Encuesta de Estructura Salarial) for 2006 and increased by 5% to take 
it to 2007. Finally, the social security contribution rate is assumed to be equal to 
95% of the contribution rate for ordinary contingencies under the general so-
cial security system, calculated as the sum of the rates applicable to the company 
(23.6%) and the worker (4.7%). 
5.4 Projection of total pension expenditure as a share of GDP
In the model sketched out in the previous section and in Annex 2 the ratio be-
tween the average pension (retirement and survivors) and aggregate average wages 
is given by
 (t) (C)b(N)e   = =P(t) C
–nC
W(t)
n – 
g + n – 
1–e
–(n–)C1–e
–(g+n–   )1– (1–      )e – e
–nX  –n(X+X2)1– (1–   )e – e
 X –(g+n–   ) (X+X2) 
 
  [9]
where
 b(N) =
(g+)N
1–e–(g+)N  [10]
is the base for the pension calculation (expressed as a fraction of the worker’s salary at 
the time of retirement), (C) is the percentage of the base which will correspond to 
a pensioner who has paid contributions for C years and  is the rate at which pen-
sions grow in real terms once their initial amount has been set (which will be zero in 
the case of Spain, as they are updated in line with the CPI).
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Using this expression and the values of the parameters that appear in Table 5.3.1.1 
we have calculated the steady-state values of the ratio P/W predicted by the model 
(see Table 5.4.1). The value of the ratio P/W observed in 2007 for retirement pen-
sions (under the general regime) is 0.51, well below the model’s prediction. If the 
model is correct, this would indicate that we are still a long way from the steady 
state and that the upward tendency of P/W we have observed during recent dec-
ades will persist into the future, even if all the parameters of the system keep the 
values observed in the period 1980-2007 indefinitely. Moreover, the value of the 
ratio P/W predicted by the model is higher for the period 2007-13 than for 1980-
2007 in all three scenarios. As explained in Annex 2, this seems to be due to the 
increase in the average number of years during which contributions will be paid 
that we are expecting to see over the coming decades, under our relatively opti-
mistic assumptions about the evolution of the employment rate.
In an attempt to be conservative, we will not use the model’s prediction direct-
ly for the steady state of the ratio P/W. Instead, we will assume that this ratio will 
increase gradually between 2007 and 2060 by the same proportion as the mod-
el’s prediction for 2007-60 increases in relation to the prediction for 1980-2007. 
That is to say, in each scenario, the value of P/W in 2060 has been estimated by 
multiplying the value of the ratio observed in 2007 by the index which appears in 
the second column of Table 5.4.1. We will also assume that this increment takes 
place at a uniform rate over the period. Finally, we will assume that wages remain 
constant over time as a share of national income. We therefore arrive at the pro-
jection of the ratio between the average pension and the output per employed 
person that is shown in Chart 5.4.1.
Combining this projection with the relevant demographic and employment sce-
narios, and assuming that the system’s coverage ratio (number of pensions per person 
of retirement age) remains constant, we finally obtain the projection of total pension 
expenditure as a fraction of GDP shown in Chart 5.4.2. As previously, all the opti-
mistic and pessimistic scenarios are combined to construct the “confidence interval” 
around the baseline scenario. 
Chart 5.4.2 also shows the system’s expected income, which we hold constant 
over time at the value observed in 2007 (8.81% of GDP). With this assump-
Estimated value Index
1980-2007 0.704 100.0
2007-2060, baseline 0.829 117.7
2007-2060, optimistic 0.787 111.9
2007-2060, pessimistic 0.902 128.2
ESTIMATED STATIONARY VALUES OF RATIO P/W  TABLE 5.4.1 
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tion, the system would go into deficit in 2023 in the baseline scenario, 2031 in 
the optimistic scenario and in 2014 in the pessimistic scenario. If we assume that 
the system’s surplus during the initial years of the period is devoted to the reserve 
fund and that this fund generates a 2% real return, the accumulated resources in 
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Obs 2007 Pessimistic Baseline Optimistic
Expenditure/GDP 7.43% 26.17% 18.62% 14.51%
Index, 2007=100 100.0 352.3 250.7 195.3
GROWTH OF PENSION EXPENDITURE/GDP 
(OBSERVED VALUES IN 2007 AND EXPECTED VALUES IN 2060, 2007 = 100)
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the fund would cover the current deficit of the system up until 2032 in the base-
line scenario, 2044 in the optimistic scenario and 2024 in the pessimistic sce-
nario. These results are similar to those obtained by Doménech and Melguizo 
(2008). Once the reserve fund has been exhausted, the system’s debt (also accru-
ing at a rate of 2% a year in real terms) would skyrocket, to reach 234% of GDP 
in 2060 in the baseline scenario (74% in the optimistic scenario and 585% in the 
pessimistic scenario), as Chart 5.4.3 shows.
5.4.1 Comparison with the results of other studies
In general terms, our results are consistent with those of previous studies. 
Table 5.4.1 compares our projections of pension spending for 2050 with those 
of other authors, and insofar as it is possible, it identifies the source of the dif-
ferences between baseline scenarios in terms of the main components of the ex-
penditure indicator. 
All the studies foresee a substantial increase in pension spending over the next 
few decades, primarily as a result of the sharp increase in the dependency rate pre-
dicted by the INE and Eurostat’s demographic scenarios, which all authors take as 
their starting point. The employment scenarios are also fairly similar, and point 
towards an increase in employment rates (from initial values around 62) which, 
however, will be unable to compensate for the effects of ageing. The biggest dis-
crepancies have to do with the behaviour of the ratio of the average pension to 
output per employee. Whereas some studies estimate that this ratio will remain 
constant or even fall slightly over the coming decades, others predict an increase 
of as much as 100%. The origin of these differences is not easy to ascertain. In 
some cases this component of spending is projected only approximately. However, 
there does not seem to be a consensus on this issue even among the studies that 
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use more detailed data on employment histories and transitions, in order to in-
corporate the heterogeneity of the population and the peculiarities of the pension 
calculation in a realistic way when forecasting this expense component.
5.5  Reforms necessary to ensure the viability of the pension 
system: a first approximation
In this section we will use the pensions model sketched out above to analyse the 
impact of possible reforms of the pension system on its sustainability over the next 
half century. Our approach is similar to that taken in the previous section: taking 
the average values of the relevant variables in 1980-2007 and 2007-60 (for each of 
the scenarios) as a reference for setting the values of the parameters of the model, 
we will analyse the long-term sustainability of the current system and the impact 
possible reforms might have on it.
As indicated in Annex 2, the model tells us that the pensions system will be in 
financial equilibrium (income = expenses) provided the following condition is met:
 =    
n– (C,N)
e –1(g–)C   1–(1– –)e e–(g+n–   )X –(g+n–   )(X+X2)
g+n–    [11]
where (C,N)=(CBN) is the system’s initial replacement rate, defined as the 
ratio between the initial pension and salary at the time of retirement. If we take 
Expenditure/GDP Values on baseline scenario
Baseline Min Max
Employment
rate
Dependency
ratio
Average 
pension/
productivity
This study 18.1 13.1 26.1 71.4 59.1 19.6
Jimeno (2000) 19 26.6 71.4 30
EPC (2006) 15.7 71.3 65.4 17.1
MITIN (2008) 15.3
Gil et al (2007) 15 12 16 67 19.2
Balmaseda, Melguizo and Taguas (2006) 18.7 13.5 24 75.1 54 21
Díaz Saavedra and Díaz Gimenez (2006) 18.2
da Rocha and Lores (2006) 25.5 68.8 56.2 35.1
Ahn et al (2005) 20
Jimeno, Rojas and Puente (2006) 19.6 16 70 56 22.6
Moral-Arce et al (2006) 15.5 14.4 71.4 65.6 16
Average 18.2 13.8 23.2 71.4 60.5 22.6
PROJECTIONS OF CONTRIBUTORY PENSION EXPENDITURE IN 2050
(PERCENTAGES)
 
 
TABLE 5.4.1
NOTE: In this study, the employment rate and dependency ratio are usually calculated taking  the population 
aged 18-64 as the reference. To facilitate comparisons with other studies, the table shows the values both 
ratios take when calculated using the population aged 15-64 as the reference, which is that generally used 
in the literature.  
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as given the rate of contribution to the social security system, , we can use this 
condition to calculate the sustainable initial replacement rate, ~, (i.e. the rate that 
would balance income and expenditure in the steady state). Alternatively, taking 
as given the initial replacement rate produced by the system, we can calculate the 
sustainable contribution rate, ~ . Finally, the model also tells us that the system is 
in long-term equilibrium if and only if its IRR is not greater than the sum of the 
rates of growth of employment and productivity, g+n.
Table 5.5.1 shows the three sustainability indicators just mentioned. The cur-
rent system would be sustainable over the long term with the demographic and 
growth parameters observed on average from 1980-2007. Under these circum-
stances, it might even be possible to reduce the contribution rate slightly or in-
crease the replacement rate by almost two points without jeopardising the long-
term equilibrium between income and expenditure. Given our demographic and 
employment scenarios, however, the situation going forward is very different. The 
current system will not be sustainable even on most optimistic scenario of the 
three we have considered.
The problem is basically demographic. All the forecasts suggest a very much 
reduced rate of growth of the working age population, accompanied by a sig-
nificant lengthening of life expectancy. Even on the basis of highly favourable as-
sumptions about labour market performance, the rate of growth of the system’s 
income will slow markedly, thus reducing its sustainable IRR, while the lengthen-
ing of the period over which pensions are drawn tends to raise their real IRR. In 
order to re-establish the balance, it would be necessary to increase contribution 
rates significantly (by between 16 and 54 percentage points), which would be 
highly unwise, or reduce the replacement rate by between 30 and 56 points.
As we shall see, a third option is to delay retirement. Before examining this 
possibility, let us consider the effects on the sustainability of the system of three 
reforms that have often been suggested: extending the pension calculation pe-
2007-2060
Baseline Optimistic Pessimistic
Observed contribution rate (employer + employee) 26.89% 26.89% 26.89% 26.89%
Sustainable contribution rate 26.23% 56.92% 43.20% 81.84%
Necessary increase -0.66% 30.04% 16.31% 54.60%
Replacement rate produced by the system 69.47% 80.76% 79.54% 83.08%
Sustainable replacement rate 71.20% 38.14% 49.51% 27.41%
Necessary reduction -1.74% 42.61% 30.04% 55.67%
Estimated IRR of current system 2.91% 4.04% 4.20% 3.84%
Sustainable IRR 3.03% 1.25% 2.46% -0.35%
Necessary reduction -0.12% 2.79% 1.74% 4.18%
1980-2007
INDICATORS OF SUSTAINABILITY OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM ON VARIOUS 
SCENARIOS 
TABLE 5.5.1 
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riod, increasing the number of years needed to be entitled to a “full pension” 
(i.e. to 100% of the pension base) and updating pensions at less than the rate 
of inflation.
Chart 5.5.1 shows the impact of increasing the number of years of a work-
er’s wage history that are used to calculate his pension on the system’s initial 
replacement rate under the parameters of our baseline scenario for 2007-60. 
Starting out from the current situation, extending the calculation period would 
reduce the replacement rate on an approximately linear basis but at a relative-
ly modest rate. Making the calculation period equal to the number of years 
of contributions by the representative pensioner (33 in the baseline scenario) 
would reduce the replacement rate by just 14 points, leaving it still 28 points 
above its sustainable value.32
The second option we explore is extending the period necessary to obtain a 
“full pension.” In order to parameterise this reform appropriately, we first as-
sume that a “linear system” is adopted, with a constant accrual rate for pension 
calculations – that is to say, a system in which the pension entitlement, meas-
ured as a % of the “full pension”, increases linearly with time at a rate of 1/A 
points per year, where A is the number of years necessary to reach 100% of the 
pension base. Chart 5.5.2 shows the sensitivity of the replacement rate to A, 
starting out from the current replacement rate for the average pensioner.33 As 
in the previous case, the effect of the measure is significant but insufficient to 
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32 And assuming that the measure does not translate into an increase in early retirement, a danger 
pointed out by Díaz Giménez and Díaz Saavedra (2008).
33 That is to say, we take as our starting point the value of A (= 34.4) which would give the same  as 
the current system to our hypothetical representative pensioner (on the baseline scenario).
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guarantee the long-term viability of the system. Increasing the period required 
to reach 100% of the pension base to 50 years would reduce the replacement 
rate by 25 points, leaving it 18 points above its sustainable value.
A third possibility would be to update pensions, once granted, at a rate below 
the CPI. Chart 5.5.3 illustrates the consequences of indexing pensions at a rate 
equal to CPI – , where the variable  is shown on the horizontal axis. In this 
case, the system’s initial replacement rate does not change, as the initial pension 
would continue to be calculated in the same way as at present, but the lower 
expenditure growth rate would translate into an increase in the initial sustain-
able replacement rate. The graph shows that the impact of this measure would 
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be very modest: updating pensions two points below inflation would only buy an 
increase in the sustainable replacement rate of 8.7 points.
The combination of the three measures just considered would still not be suf-
ficient to ensure sustainability under the baseline scenario, although it would just do 
the trick under the most optimistic scenario. Table 5.5.2 summarises the incidence 
of each of these measures and various combinations of them on the system’s IRR 
and initial replacement rate34 in each of our scenarios. Adopting all three proposed 
measures simultaneously would still leave us half a point above the sustainable IRR 
of the system (and 5.5 points above the sustainable replacement rate) in the base sce-
nario. It should be kept in mind that the figures in the table will tend to overestimate 
the impact of both reforms in the short term. What the model shows are long-term 
or steady-state effects, but these will take time to become fully effective because the 
introduction of the measures envisaged (with the exception of the change in the pen-
sion indexing rate) will only affect new pensioners and not existing ones. It is also 
foreseeable that measures of this type will be introduced only gradually, which would 
lengthen the transition period yet further. As a result, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that changes in the way in which pensions are calculated do not, by themselves, pro-
vide a sufficient margin for action to ensure the sustainability of the system.
Looked at from a different angle, the results we have just summarised imply 
that the switch to a defined contribution system, with benefits based on actuarial 
criteria to guarantee the sustainability of the system, would result in a drastic cut 
in pensions from their current levels. This all points towards raising the retire-
34 It should be borne in mind that modifying the index used to update pensions does not affect the ini-
tial replacement rate but does affect the sustainable value of this indicator. In this case, therefore, only the ef-
fect on IRR is shown.
Baseline scenario Optimistic scenario
IRR
Replacement
rate
IRR
Replacement
rate
Current system 4.04% 80.76% 4.20% 79.54%
Sustainable values 1.25% 38.14% 2.46% 49.51%
After reforms
1  Calculation period = contribution period 3.33% 66.42% 3.29% 61.92%
2  Linear system + 50 years for 100%
of calculation basis
2.67% 55.55% 2.87% 55.32%
3  Pensions indexed to CPI – 0.5% 3.87% 4.03%
1 and 2 simultaneously 1.93% 45.69% 1.94% 43.06%
1, 2 and 3 simultaneously 1.74% 1.74%
EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE CALCULATION PROCEDURE TABLE 5.5.2 
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ment age as the most effective alternative and, no doubt, the most desirable way 
of ensuring the sustainability of the system while minimising the necessary cut in 
the value of pensions.
5.5.1 Implications of delaying retirement
Analysing the effects of raising the retirement age is more complex than ana-
lysing those of the previous measures because a reform of this kind would also af-
fect many of the parameters of the model, including the average number of years 
of contributions, the evolution of employment and the length of time over which 
pensions are drawn. This in turn affects the IRR and the initial replacement rate 
of the system and its sustainable values. 
Firstly, therefore, it is necessary to rerun our employment scenarios in the light 
of the new policy and re-parameterise the model. Let us assume that, starting in 
2008 the retirement age is raised by two months a year until it reaches 70 years, 
and that the employment rate among individuals who have to postpone their re-
tirement remains the same as seen in 2007 for the population aged 60 to 64, 
according to the EPA (33%). Using these assumptions, we have recalculated the 
variation in total employment, the employment rate, the average contribution pe-
riod and the average number of years during which a pension is drawn with the 
results summarised in Table 5.5.1 and Chart 5.5.1 This exercise has been carried 
out using both the baseline and the optimistic scenarios. In order to calculate the 
average period during which the pension is drawn, we have subtracted an average 
retirement age of 68.6 years from the average life expectancy over the period.
Table 5.5.2 shows the long-term effects of delaying the average retirement to 
68.6 years, maintaining other features of the current system unchanged. In the 
Baseline Optimistic
Retirement
65
Delayed
retirement
Retirement
65
Delayed
retirement
Output growth per worker (g) 1.13% 1.13% 1.70% 1.70%
Total employment growth (n) 0.12% 0.21% 0.76% 0.85%
Average employment rate 18-64 70.33% 73.21% 72.87% 75.49%
Average years of contributions (C) 33.05 34.41 34.25 35.48
Life expectancy
Population as a whole 85.9 85.9 85.9 85.9
Men 83.5 83.5 83.5 83.5
Women 88.3 88.3 88.3 88.3
X = years drawing retirement pension 20.90 17.27 20.90 17.27
X2= additional years surviving spouse's pension 5.15 5.15 5.15 5.15
Retirement age (average) 65 68.63 65 68.63
PARAMETERISATION OF THE MODEL ON DIFFERENT SCENARIOS
(2007-60)
 TABLE 5.5.1  
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baseline scenario the change increases the sustainable replacement rate by 9 points 
and the observed replacement rate by 2.25 points, reducing the viability gap ex-
pressed in terms of this indicator by almost 7 points. It also reduces the system’s 
IRR by 52 basis points and increases the sustainable IRR by 9 basis points, there-
by reducing the viability gap in terms of IRR by 0.61 percent. In the present 
case, moreover, the long-term calculation made by the model underestimates the 
effects of the policy change, as there is a transition effect that the model does 
not capture. This effect is positive and may be significant: by raising the retire-
ment age the average period during which individuals contribute to the system 
is gradually extended and the average period over which they draw a pension is 
shortened. Until both factors stabilise, this will tend to raise the revenue growth 
rate and to reduce expenditure.35
However, our results suggest that raising the retirement age by a reasonable 
amount would be insufficient by itself to ensure the long-term viability of the 
35 See da Rocha and Lores (2005).
Baseline scenario Optimistic scenario
∆IRR ∆Replacement
rate
∆IRR ∆Replacement
rate
Observed values -0.52% 2.27% -0.49% 1.99%
Sustainable values 0.09% 8.99% 0.08% 10.45%
Sustainability gap -0.61% -6.72% -0.57% -8.46%
EFFECTS OF RAISING THE RETIREMENT AGE TABLE 5.5.2  
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system in the baseline scenario. In order to achieve this it would also be neces-
sary to modify the procedure for calculating pensions in line with the suggestions 
made above. Table 5.5.3 shows the additional effects that the adoption of these 
measures would have in combination with raising the retirement age. On the 
baseline scenario, adopting the first two reforms proposed in the previous section 
would situate us precisely on the threshold of viability (extending the pension 
calculation period and the number of years necessary to reach 100% of the pen-
sion base). In the case of the optimistic scenario, it would be sufficient to adopt 
either of these two measures to achieve the same objective.
5.6 Conclusion and recommendations
On current demographic forecasts the Spanish contributory pension system 
is unsustainable over the long term, even if we make optimistic assumptions 
about the future evolution of employment rates, productivity growth and im-
migration. If the recovery from the current crisis is reasonably quick, produc-
tivity grows at a rate above 1%, the female employment rate approaches the 
male employment rate, and immigration falls only gradually, it is possible that 
the system will take as long as a decade to go into deficit and that the reserve 
fund accumulated during the period will allow us to continue paying pensions 
without problems for eight or nine more years. However, once we have reached 
this point, the debt necessary to maintain the current system will explode, ris-
ing to levels above 100% of GDP in just a few years. Given the system’s huge 
inertia, the only way to avoid reaching an unsustainable situation would be to 
start adopting a series of measures immediately. These should go beyond the 
minor tinkering that has been considered until now within the Pacto de Toledo 
– the framework agreement on pensions reached by the main political parties 
and social actors in the mid-nineties. 
Baseline scenario Optimistic scenario
IRR
Replacement
rate
IRR
Replacement
rate
Current system (with retirement at 67.25 years) 3.52% 83.03% 3.71% 81.53%
Sustainable values 1.33% 47.14% 2.54% 59.96%
After reforms
Calculation period = contribution period 2.73% 67.34% 2.70% 62.51%
Linear system + 50 years for 100%
of calculation basis
2.14% 57.82% 2.37% 57.31%
Both measures 1.31% 46.90% 1.32% 43.94%
EFFECT OF CHANGES IN CALCULATION PROCEDURE WITH GRADUAL 
RAISING OF RETIREMENT AGE 
TABLE 5.5.3  
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Given that it does not seem reasonable to embark on a spiral of rapidly in-
creasing taxes and/or social security contributions which would end up suffo-
cating the economy, the only feasible option is to reduce the generosity and/
or duration of pensions to sustainable levels, extending the period over which 
pensions are calculated, increasing the number of years needed to reach 100% 
of the pension base and gradually raising the retirement age, as other OECD 
countries have done.36 The necessary cut in the replacement rate may be made 
by means of a formal change to a defined contribution system in which pen-
sions are not set in advance but calculated on the basis of actuarial criteria at 
the time of retirement, or by modifying the parameters of the existing system 
to obtain an equivalent result. In any event, our calculations suggest that it 
would be necessary to start to act immediately. Some of the measures we have 
examined may have adverse effects on lower income individuals’ retirement de-
cisions and other important transition effects that our model does not capture. 
Both factors could modify our results somewhat and require adjustments to the 
details of some of our recommendations, but they are unlikely to change the 
essence of the diagnosis or the general lines of the necessary treatment. In the 
demographic circumstances envisaged over the coming decades, the level of in-
come that we will be able to guarantee our old people is, in relative terms, sig-
nificantly less than at present, especially if we are not willing to accept a delay 
of a few years in the retirement age.
6 Concluding remarks
The central thesis of this chapter is that Spain urgently needs to undertake a 
series of profound structural reforms. In particular, these need to include:
–  Reaching a minimum consensus among the various political parties to give 
the educational system the stability it needs to function properly.
–  Stepping up corrective measures to reduce the risk of educational fail-
ure among least favoured pupils, concentrating efforts in this regard on 
the early stages of education. Eliminating the single track through the 
last stage of compulsory secondary education, or at least relaxing it so as 
36 Over the last decade a large number of OECD member countries have reformed their public pension 
systems. Many of them have extended the period over which pensions are calculated so as to bring them 
closer to the individual’s total working life. Some of them have also raised retirement ages to over 65, linking 
the retirement age in some case to variations in life expectancy and/or introducing various mechanisms to al-
low the value of pensions to be adapted to demographic circumstances. The most ambitious reforms have 
been undertaken in Italy, Portugal and Sweden. For more details, see Alonso and Conde (2007) and OECD 
(2007b). 
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to allow for the introduction of more flexible curricula. Strengthening 
the incentives to promote academic excellence so that students continue 
their education and training after they have finished their compulsory 
schooling.
–  Reforming collective bargaining by defining the type of elements that 
should be set in each of the three spheres of negotiation (national, sector-
specific and corporate) and establishing more flexible opt-out clauses, with 
the aim that wage negotiations adequately reflect the economic conditions 
in each firm and reduce the current system’s tendency to make adjustments 
almost exclusively through employment levels.
–  Creation of a single type of job contract with severance pay linked to length 
of service, without any type of discontinuities relating to contract duration, 
so that the cost of dismissal for new employees rises gradually with their 
length of service.
–  Speeding up the adoption of reforms to intensify competition in goods and 
services markets, to bring down administrative costs and to make it easier 
to start up new businesses (in terms of the number of administrative steps, 
time and cost). 
–  Setting up a national commission bringing together all the regional institu-
tions and other actors involved to simplify and unify legislation on the do-
mestic market in a common regulatory framework.
–  Improving the geographical mobility of the labour force by increasing the 
supply of rental housing by strengthening landlords’ legal position rather 
than by creating additional tax incentives.
–  Reducing the generosity and/or duration of pensions to sustainable levels, 
by extending the pension calculation period and the number of years it 
takes to reach a 100% pension and gradually raising the retirement age, as 
has been happening in other European countries.
As readers will have noticed, neither our recommendations nor the analy-
sis on which they are based are particularly new. In recent years the academic 
community, international organisations and other private commentators and 
have produced a huge amount of work on the challenges faced by the Spanish 
economy and the policies that would be necessary in order to overcome them. 
To a large extent, our work has limited itself to summarising and reiterating 
what numerous experts have been saying for a long time about these issues in 
the hope that repetition will help the message sink in.
The Spanish government is fully aware of the problems we have discussed 
here. The National Reform Programme (Programa Nacional de Reformas de Es-
paña, PNR) adopted in 2005, as part of the European effort to re-launch the Lis-
bon Strategy, is subtitled “convergence and employment.” The document begins 
Ageing and real convergence: challenges and proposals  257
Ángel de la Fuente and Rafael Dom
énech
with an analysis of the evolution of the Spanish economy and its structural weak-
nesses, which has a lot in common with that in section 2 of this paper, and which 
identifies two of the objectives we proposed above as the priorities for Spanish 
economic policy: full income convergence with our European neighbours and 
raising the employment rate, while also emphasising the challenge the current 
process of ageing represents. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the PNR establishes a series of axes of ac-
tion, which include investment in human capital (axis 3), improving the labour 
market (axis 6) and adopting measures that guarantee the future equilibrium of 
the pension system (included in axes 1 and 6). Within these axes of action, the 
PNR sets out a host of concrete measures, including in particular the following. 
On the subject of pensions (p. 62) it proposes advancing towards a “greater match 
between the contributions and benefits when determining retirement pensions” 
and establishing “new limitations on the recognition of minimum pensions,” al-
though it also proposes increasing these at a rate above inflation. On the subject 
of education (pp. 79-81), one of the priorities is to bolster pre-primary schooling 
by expanding the number of public slots for children aged 0 to 3 years at a rate of 
2% a year until demand is met, and to guarantee free schooling for all children in 
the second stage of this phase (3 to 6 years). It also proposes bolstering the sup-
port measures for pupils with difficulties in primary and secondary education, 
placing the emphasis on early detection and correction of learning difficulties and 
encouraging the integration of pupils from immigrant families. Finally, as regards 
the labour market (pp. 126-31) establishing or enhancing incentives for hiring 
women and young people on permanent contracts, modernising public employ-
ment services and reviewing the contractual basis of temporary work and the cost 
of temporary and permanent hiring and maintaining the main lines of the inter-
confederation agreement on collective bargaining (Acuerdo Interconfederal para la 
Negociación colectiva), which is perceived as a useful instrument in maintaining 
salary moderation.
The progress made towards implementing the measures put forward in the 
PNR is described in the 2006-2008 annual reports on the plan’s progress (MP, 
various years). On the subject of pensions, the reports emphasize the successive 
contributions to the reserve fund (which had accumulated a total of 56,000 mil-
lion euros by 2008), the extension to fifteen years of the effective minimum con-
tribution period required for access to a contributory pension (as compared with 
12.6 years previously), and the generalisation of incentives to voluntarily extend 
working life beyond 65 years by establishing pension top-ups for each additional 
year worked. In relation to the labour market, partial waivers on employer con-
tributions and other incentives for permanent contracts have been extended. As 
regards education, significant progress has been made in schooling rates for chil-
dren under three. Another highlight is the passing and gradual implementation of 
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the new Organic Law on Education (Ley Orgánica de Educación, LOE), which is 
accompanied by an additional budgetary allocation of several billion euros which 
will basically be devoted to measures designed to lower school failure rates and 
bolster equal opportunity. The law also includes some significant steps forward, 
such as the introduction of diagnostic evaluations of basic competencies in the 
fourth year of primary education and the second year of secondary education.
While most of these measures point in the right direction, they do not go far 
enough. They are, by and large, minor modifications which do not alter the basic 
structure of education or pension systems or the model of labour relations. For 
example, there is no mention whatsoever, of changes to the retirement age or of 
reforms to the collective bargaining process. Moreover, the government has made 
an explicit commitment not to undertake any reform of the pension system or 
of the labour market without the explicit support of the social agents. To some 
extent, this may be reasonable, given that the cooperation of the trade unions 
and employers is virtually a sine qua non for any reform in this area to be feasible. 
However, the government and the main political parties cannot abdicate their re-
sponsibilities: they must openly recognize the existence of problems, offer solu-
tions for them, even if they are painful for certain groups in the short term, and 
actively seek the support necessary to implement them. The long-term benefits 
for Spanish society as a whole undoubtedly more than compensate the effort we 
need to make today. 
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Annex 1: Definitions and sources of the data used 
in section 2
–  GDP at purchasing power parity. In some countries it has been necessary to 
re-scale GDP slightly to enable relative per capita income comparisons with 
data available in Eurostat in August 2008. 
  Sources: Economic Outlook, OECD, and National Accounts, OECD, vari-
ous years. PWT 6.2 for the period 1950-59, growth rates used for back-
ward extrapolation.
–  Population, working age population, labour force and unemployment rate. 
  Sources: Economic Outlook, OECD, and National Accounts and Employ-
ment Outlook, OECD, various years. PWT 6.2 for the period 1950-59, 
growth rates used for backward extrapolation. The working age population 
refers to the population between 15-64 years and 16-64 for Norway, Spain, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. The employed popu-
lation is consistent with national accounts, so may not be the same as that 
stated in the OECD Labour Force Survey. 
–  Hours worked: Number of hours worked per employee per year across the 
economy as a whole.
  Sources: Economic Outlook, OECD, 2008(1). Austria 2004-2007, Employ-
ment Outlook, OECD, 2008. The data for Greece in 2007 refer to 2006. 
For years previous to those available from the OECD, the hours estimated 
by Groningen Growth and Development Centre, having been extrapolated 
backward using their growth rates.
–  Private productive capital stock. The same methodology as for the perma-
nent inventory method in de la Fuente and Doménech (2006a) has been 
used to calculate the initial capital stock in 1950, but distinguishing be-
tween the private productive capital series, and residential investment and 
public capital. The depreciation rates are those published by Kamps (2006). 
  Sources: Economic Outlook, OECD, and National Accounts, OECD, vari-
ous years. PWT 6.2 for the period 1950-59, growth rates used for back-
ward extrapolation.
–  Years of schooling among the population aged over 25 years. 
  Source: de la Fuente and Domenech (2006). Data for the most recent 
years have been estimated by applying growth rates from Cohen and Soto 
(2007), available up to 2010. 
–  R&D expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
 Source: Main Science and Technology Indicators, OECD.
–  Cost of regulations affecting economic activity. Corresponds to the average 
of the standardised values for the 21 OECD countries in 2006 of the cost 
of setting up and closing down a company, red tape, regulations on hiring 
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employees, the cost of registering ownership and accessing credit, investor 
protection and contract protection (both variables with a negative sign), the 
tax burden and ease of foreign trade (also with a negative sign). 
 Source: Doing Business 2007, World Bank.
–  Inflation. Rate of growth of the private consumption deflator. 
 Source: Economic Outlook, OECD.
–  Structural unemployment rate. NAIRU estimated by the OECD. 
 Source: Economic Outlook, OECD.
–  Public Deficit. Source: Economic Outlook, OECD.
–  Index of macroeconomic instability. Average of the standardised inflation se-
ries, structural unemployment rate and public deficit. 
–  PISA results for 2006. Source: Education at a Glance (2008), OECD.
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Annex 2
1  Construction of the third (“optimistic”) 
demographic scenario
Let P et be the population of age e on 1 January of year t according to the base-
line scenario. First of all, we calculate the gross survival rate for each age group 
between years t–1 and t, and the “gross fertility” of the population between 20 
and 40 years, defined as:
 =eS P / t
e
t P 
e–1
t–1  and =
e P / t 0t P 20–40t–1
The projected population under the new scenario 
eP t is constructed recursively 
from the population in 2008 on the baseline scenario, applying the survival rates 
from the baseline scenario defined above for each age group, incrementing the 
gross fertility rate by 10% and adding the additional influx of immigrants (I), 
such that:
 =eP P +t
e–1
t–1s 
e
t I 
e–1
t–1  for t>0 and = 1.1 P 
20–40
t–1ƒ tP 
0
t *
It should be noted that for the purposes of the calculations the population 
aged 80+ has been added as a single group (unlike other ages, which are broken 
down year by year). In this case we obtain:
 =80+s P /t
80+
t P 
79+
t–1  and = P 
79+
t–1P 
80+
t
80+s t
Note that in this approach we take the average birth-rate and mortality as-
sumptions from the baseline scenario, at least approximately, and we also ap-
ply them to the new entrants, with the relevant modifications. Given that the 
gross survival rate we have calculated also takes immigration into account, we 
are implicitly increasing the rate of immigration by somewhat more than the 
initial 50%.
2 A simple model of pension expenditure
This section briefly summarises the pension expenditure model developed in 
de la Fuente (2009).
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2.1 Demography and wage growth
Let us suppose that the number of births increases over time at a constant rate, 
n, such that the number of individuals born at time s is given by:
 L(s)=e ns [1]
An individual born at time s joins the labour market (and starts to work im-
mediately) at time s+E, retires at s+J, dies at s+Z, and has a probability  of being 
survived by a widowed spouse who survives until s+Z2. 
Let us suppose that wages are exogenous and increase over time and with the 
individual’s experience. In particular, the real salary at time t h[s+E, s+J] of an in-
dividual born at time s is given by:
 W(s,t) = Ate
[t–(s+E)] = Aoe gte (t–s–E) [2]
where At reflects the effects of technical progress and the accumulation of capital 
on aggregate wage levels and the term e(t–s–E) is the premium on the individual’s 
experience. To simplify the calculations, we have assumed that the experience pre-
mium grows at a constant rate, , and that it does not present the hump-shape 
that is normally found in the data.
2.1.1 Calculating the pension
The model reflects, in simplified form, the approach used in Spain to calculate 
the value of contributory pensions. The initial pension an individual born at time 
s receives on retirement at s+J is calculated as:
 P (s,s+J,C,N) = (C)B(s,s+J,N) [3]
where is a percentage dependent on the number of years of contributions, and 
 C = J–E [4]
as specified in the current legislation (see section 3 of this Annex) and B() is the 
pension base, defined as the worker’s average wages over the last N years prior to 
retirement. We refer to N as the calculation period for the pension.
In order to work out the pension base, wages from previous years are up-
dated using the CPI (except for those in the last two years, which we ignore 
in order to simplify the calculations). Given that we are working directly with 
real wages, the updating is implicit, and we obtain:
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= =
(g+)N
1–e –(g+)N s+J
s+J–N
W (s,t)dt W (s,s+J) b(N)W(s,s+J)B(s,s+J,N) = 1
N 
 
[5]
The pension base is, therefore, a fraction of the worker’s wages at the time of 
retirement. It is easy to confirm that this fraction is a decreasing function of the 
length of the period over which the pension is calculated (N) and the growth rate 
of the individual’s wages (g+). 
The initial pension can therefore be written as follows:
 P(s,s+J,C,N) = (C)b(N)W(s,s+J) = (C,N)W(s,s+J)  [6]
where () = ()b() is the ratio of the salary at the time of retirement to the initial 
pension. We will refer to this variable as the individual’s initial replacement rate.
The model allows pensions to be updated using an index other than the CPI. 
If we call the real pension growth rate , the pension (P), in real terms, a pen-
sioner retiring in year s+J would receive in year t is given by:
P(s,t,C,N) = P(s,s + J,C,N)e[t–(s+J)]= (C,N)W(s,s+J)ete–(s+J) for t h [s+J, s+Z] [7]
When the worker dies, if he or she leaves a spouse, this spouse will draw a sur-
viving spouse’s pension (PV) for the rest of his or her life, the value of which, in 
constant prices, will be equal to:
PV(s,t,C,N) = P(s,t,C,N) =  (C,N)W(s,s+J)et e–(s+J) for t h [s+Z, s+Z2] [8]
where  = 0.52 in the general case. 
2.1.2 The IRR of the pension system
From the worker’s point of view, the public contributory pension system can 
be considered an investment vehicle allowing him or her to ensure a life-long in-
come after retirement in exchange for a flow of contributions during his or her 
working life. It can be shown that the internal rate of return (IRR) on this invest-
ment is the value of r which solves the following equation: 
 
=    
r–g–v
(C,N)e –1
(r–g–)C   1– (1– –)e e–(r–   )X –(r–   )(X+X2)
r–    [9]
where
 X=Z–J [10]
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is the length of time over which the retirement pension is drawn.
 X2 = Z2–Z [11]
is the length of time over which the surviving spouse’s pension is drawn (which is 
paid out with a probability of ) and is the rate of social security contributions 
related to the pension system (including both the employee and employer contri-
butions).
2.1.3 Aggregate magnitudes
By integrating over the date of birth, s, it is straightforward to calculate the in-
come and expenses of the pension system at any moment in time and for a given 
average salary and pension. As shown in de la Fuente (2009), the ratio between 
the average pension and average salary is given by
   
(t) (C,N)e  = =P(t) C
W(t)
n – 
g + n – 
1–e
1– e –(n–)C
–nC –(g+n–   )1– (1–       )e – e
–nX –n(X+X2)1– (1–   )e – e
 X –(g+n–   ) (X+X2) 
 

 
[12]
Moreover, it can be checked that the expenditure of the system each year will be 
less than its revenues provided that the following inequality is fulfilled
 
>_    
n– (C,N)
e –1(n–)C   1– (1– –)e e–(g+n–   )X –(g+n–   )(X+X2)
g+n–    [13]
Working with this expression as an equality, the sustainable replacement rate 
can be calculated for a given contribution rate  which is the contribution rate 
necessary to maintain the financial equilibrium of the system given the values of 
its parameters. Finally, it is possible to show that the condition for sustainability 
given in [13] is fulfilled if and only if the IRR of the system is not greater than 
the rate of growth of aggregate wages, i.e., if and only if
 r<_ g+n [14]
2.1.4 What does the ratio P/W depend on?
Charts A2.2.1 and A2.2.2 show the sensitivity of the steady-state value of 
the ratio P/W to increments in the rate of growth of productivity and total 
employment and to increases in the contribution period and length of time for 
which pensions are drawn. The starting point is a typical pensioner in the pe-
riod 1980-2007.
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The steady-state value of the ratio of average pensions to average wages is neg-
ativelly affected by the average productivity growth rate, g, but much less than 
proportionally, and increases with the average number of years of contributions, 
C. This ratio is relatively insensitive to the employment growth rate, n, and life 
expectancy after retirement, X.
This result is counterintuitive and is due to the existence of widows and wid-
owers pensions. If we consider only retirement pensions, when we extend life ex-
pectancy a little, the marginal pensioner, who formerly exited from the sample 
and now lives more years, has a pension below the average. Therefore, by increas-
ing X the average pension should drop. And, given that average wages do not 
vary, the P/W ratio should also decrease. However, given that we include widows 
80 
85 
90 
95 
100 
105 
110 
0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.8% 0.9% 1.0%  
  g   n  
  
SENSITIVITY OF P/W TO INCREMENTS IN g AND n CHART A2.2.1  
90 
95 
100 
105 
110 
115 
120 
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 
  C  X     
SENSITIVITY OF P/W TO INCREASES IN C AND X CHART A2.2.2  
266 Spain and the euro. The fi rst ten years 
and widowers in the average pension calculation, the marginal pensioner could 
be close to the total average pension and his or her remaining in the sample will 
have a minimal effect on the average.
3  Determining contributory and survivor pensions 
in Spain
This section briefly describes the current rules on determining the initial value 
of the contributory and survivor pensions provided by the social security system 
in Spain and how this varies over the long term. It looks at the general case, ig-
noring the special regimes that exist.
In order to be entitled to a contributory pension it is necessary to have con-
tributed to the social security system for at least 15 years, and with a few excep-
tions we will come on to later, have reached the age of 65. The initial amount of 
the pension is determined as a percentage () of the pension base.
Initial pension = * pension base
The pension base is an average of the gross salary received by the worker over 
the last 15 years of contributions.37
 In order to calculate this average, salaries are updated with the consumer price 
index up to two years before the retirement date. Those corresponding to the last 
two years are not updated but calculated at their nominal value. The value of the 
percentage  is proportional to the years of contributions accrued by the worker. 
Those who have contributed over the required minimum of 15 years will be en-
titled to 50% of the pension base. This percentage rises by 3 points per year of 
contributions up to 25 years and by 2 points for each year between 25 and 35 
years, thus reaching 100% of the pension base after 35 years of contributions. 
As we have said, the legal retirement age is 65. In some cases, however, this age is 
lowered in view of the special demands of certain occupations. The possibility of 
early retirement also exists, but with severe restrictions. The main exception in 
this regard affects workers aged 61 or over who have lost their jobs involuntar-
ily and it implies a reduction in the pension of between 7 and 8% (depend-
ing on the number of years of contributions accrued) for each year by which 
retirement is brought forward. Moreover, retirement at 65 is not compulsory. 
37 The calculation is performed in monthly terms, using the last 180 months of contributions. The 
amount discounted from monthly salaries over this period is divided by 210 in order to calculate the month-
ly pension base. However, pensioners receive 14 annual payments (including the two extra payments), so the 
above operation compensates for the extra payments and therefore is equivalent to making the payment in 
annual terms.
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Workers who continue working beyond this age are exempt from social security 
payments and continue increasing their pension. Workers who have accumulated 
35 years of contributions can increase the percentage of their pension base above 
100% at a rate of 2 percentage points per extra year worked, until they reach the 
maximum pension set by law.
Survivor pensions are set, in the general case, at 52% of the calculation basis 
of the deceased spouse, updated according to the revaluations applied to survi-
vor pensions as of the date on which the original pension arose. Given that both 
survivor pensions and retirement pensions are updated in line with the CPI, 
this is equivalent to linking survivor pensions to the pension received by the de-
ceased spouse at the time of death, with the possible exception of maximum and 
minimum pensions, which the model in the previous section does not take into 
account. 
Once the initial value has been set, pensions are generally updated in line with 
the CPI. The annual pension increase is set based on the inflation forecast. If ac-
tual inflation is higher than that forecast, pensioners receive a compensating pay-
ment in the last month of the year, which is consolidated for future increments.
The system is financed out of social security contributions, which represent 
a fixed percentage of workers’ gross income between a floor and a ceiling. The 
contribution rate for “ordinary risks” is 23.6% for the employer and 4.7% for the 
employee. As mentioned in the text, this income also finances other benefits as 
well as pensions, so it is necessary to consider what share is allocated to pensions 
in order to estimate the system’s income.
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